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Reconsidering the Merger Process:
Approval Patterns, Timeline, and
Shareholders’ Role
MATTEO GATTI*
Shareholder approval in mergers generally takes a long time, but is it necessary?
This Article finds that in the context of mergers, the approval requirement is not
nearly as valuable a procedure as we might expect. I analyze shareholder approval
patterns (target side) in all domestic mergers with a Russell 3000 target company
in the 2006–2015 period. By examining data on voting outcomes, I note
shareholders rejected a very low number of mergers, which generally passed with
significantly high approval percentages. Instead of concluding that voting is mere
rubber-stamping by shareholders, voting positively affects mergers through the
expectation that shareholders will turn down undesirable deals. The voting
requirement signals a credible threat to corporate planners that such deals will be
rejected; as a result, they are in fact rarely presented to shareholders in the first
place (deal filtering effect of voting). The same dynamic contributes to higher
premiums than we would have experienced if a threat of rejection were absent
(premium effect of voting). However, the data also shows that voting comes with
drawbacks, the most significant being the delay in deal completion, which can
jeopardize a company’s operations and put deal certainty at risk. If the beneficial
role of shareholder voice in mergers stems from the pressure on corporate planners
generated by the credible threat of rejection embedded in the vote, I suggest
alternative ways to exert such pressure without incurring all the costs currently
involved with voting. To that end, this Article sketches three possible policy
solutions, ranging from impactful (vote-on-demand and randomized approval,
both to be opted into by companies in lieu of the current voting regime) to more
moderate (speeding up the timetable by revising the SEC review process of merger
securities filings and state corporate laws).

* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. For helpful feedback, suggestions, and
discussion, I am grateful to Sarah Dadush, Doug Eakeley, Luca Enriques, Martin Gelter, Yuliya
Guseva, Alan Hyde, John Leubsdorf, Ji Li, David Noll, Chrystin Ondersma, Sabrina Safrin, Roberto
Tallarita, Matteo Tonello, Andres Velez Calle, and participants to the faculty colloquium at Rutgers
Law School; special thanks to my research assistants Denis Fatovic and Jacob Krayn. All errors and
omissions are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Mergers do not close quickly. In almost half of mergers, the delay is
essentially driven by the shareholder approval requirement. While the
nuisance of a protracted closing period is generally acknowledged, we
have yet to identify mechanisms for shortening it, in part because we take
for granted the need to have shareholder approval procedures in place.
This Article questions this assumption and finds that shareholder
approval in the context of mergers is not nearly as valuable a procedure
as expected. It proposes alternatives to the traditional approval
requirements that would not only do away with unnecessary procedures,
but also shorten the direction of the closing process.
Let us start with the approval requirement. Even though
shareholder voting is rare in U.S. corporate law,1 it is taken very seriously.
An important takeover case from the late 1980s established “[t]he
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”2 In the 1990s, another famous
M&A case warned that “[b]ecause of the overriding importance of voting
rights, th[e Delaware Supreme] Court and the Court of Chancery have
consistently acted to protect stockholders from unwarranted interference
with such rights.”3
Mergers and other similar fundamental changes such as charter
amendments, form one of the two macro areas in which shareholder
voting is considered crucial for the proper functioning of the
corporationthe other one being director elections. Historically, the
voting requirement in mergers derives from the principle of inviolability
of contract: this explains why, since mergers alter the initial investment
contract, unanimous approval was originally necessary to pass such
transactionstoday, a majority (in some states a supermajority) of
shares suffices.4 Currently, the most credited explanation for shareholder
voting in mergers considers it a protection against potential director
abuses in a typical final period situation.5
1. See generally Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV.
129, 130 (2009) (“Voting plays a limited role in corporate decisionmaking, much more limited than in
the public sphere. Shareholders have binding votes on only two things: the election of directors and
ratifying fundamental corporate changes such as mergers.”).
2. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the stockholders are displeased with the
action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn
the board out.”).
3. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994).
4. Over the years, corporate statutes have progressively lowered the threshold from
supermajority to majority of the outstanding shares, which is what most states have adopted. See infra
notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
5. When being acquired, directors and managers of the target company might resolve to
trade-off a higher merger consideration for shareholders with some assurance that they (or some of
them or some key members of management) will stay with some role with the combined company after
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Courts and scholars stress the importance of shareholder voice in
the context of merger transactions. For the Delaware Supreme Court, in
mergers “the stockholders control their own destiny through informed
voting,” which is “the highest and best form of corporate democracy.”6
Recent pronouncements by the Delaware judiciary have reinforced this
belief:7 A new line of cases has established that under Delaware law the
fully informed, uncoerced vote of a majority of the disinterested
stockholders of a corporation approving a merger or analogous M&A
transaction8 restores the presumption of the business judgment rule in
lieu of any other more stringent type of scrutiny.9
Because of the limited circumstances in which shareholders get to
vote in corporate law, scholars consider voting rights in connection with
a merger fundamental and somewhat sacrosanct.10 Even scholars like
Easterbrook and Fischel, who normally are supporters of ample
contractual freedom and enabling statutes in corporate law, follow the
mainstream view that shareholder approval in mergers is so crucial that
it should be mandatory: “the durability and uniform acceptance of [such]
rule creates a presumption of efficiency that has not been overcome by
any contrary evidence.”11 In the opening line of an influential article of
some ten years ago, Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock observed that “[n]ever
has voting been more important in corporate law” and added that, at the

the merger is completed. The vote operates as a protection against the peculiar conflicts faced by
management in negotiated deals. See infra Part I.B.
6. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996). This passage was notably quoted by the
recent Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 n.28 (Del. 2015), which I describe infra
in the text.
7. The line of cases started with the 2015 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Corwin, 125 A.3d
at 304, which was followed by several decisions in 2016: Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151 (Del.
2016); In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2016); Larkin v. Shah,
C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016); In re Solera Holdings, Inc.
Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10485-CB, 2017 WL 57839 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2017). See infra Part I.C.
8. A transaction that is not otherwise subject to entire fairness.
9. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308–11; cf. infra Part II.C.
10. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 840, 846–47, 895–97 (2005) (arguing that shareholder prerogatives should actually be
expanded, including the right to propose, and not simply veto director-proposed, mergers, as well as
to accept third-party acquisition proposals without board obstructions); see also William J. Carney,
Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 69, 79–92 (1980) (describing the evolution of rules governing the approval of
fundamental changes).
11. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
416 (1983) (“Perhaps all that can be said is that the common law rule requiring shareholders’ approval
of fundamental corporate changes has endured for the past century across all jurisdictions. It is
unlikely that this pattern would be observed if the rule did not produce gains.”). But see id. at 415
(discussing the dichotomy between the general power of directors to run the business of the
corporation and shareholders’ powers to veto fundamental changes such as mergers, whereby they
concede that “[a]lthough this dichotomy is so well established in corporate law that it is never
questioned or analyzed, the justifications for it are obscure.”).
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time they wrote the article, “there [were] more and more closely fought
merger votes.”12
This Article examines whether it is true that merger votes are often
closely fought and, after an analysis of voting outcomes in domestic
friendly deals during the 2006–2015 period,13 determines that this is not
the case. In fact, once submitted for approval, it is extremely rare
(roughly 1% of the sample) that shareholders vote down these
transactions.14 Moreover, activist investors seldom campaign against
pending mergers: The resolutions approving these deals constitute
outliers in the overall activist climate of the last 10 or 15 years.15 In
general, most mergers are approved with high margins.16
Counter-intuitively, the data presented in this Article reveal that the high
approval percentages in mergers are not correlated with the size of
premiums offered to shareholders.17
As a whole, shareholder votes look more like an exercise of
rubber-stampingalbeit a costly one. In fact, shareholder voting in
mergers normally takes a pretty long time: between two to three months
when the process is relatively swift and more than five or six months
when it is not.18 The ensuing delay does not come cheap, especially in
terms of opportunity costs. These costs can be quite troublesome for two
sets of reasons. First, a prolonged time for closing can distract
management from the ordinary course of business, delay effective
integration, result in bad allocation of resources, and facilitate
litigation.19 Second, time can put deal certainty at risk, because, on the
one hand, it stimulates the chances of buyer remorse and, on the other
hand, it increases the value of the so-called seller’s put.20

12. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227
(2008). In particular:
The controversial merger between Compaq and HP squeaked through with the approval of
51.4% of the shares. The AXA/MONY merger was only approved after a change in the
record date, and then only by a margin of 1.7 million shares (for a total of 53.8%) at a time
when 6.2 million shares were out on loan. The Transkaryotic merger was approved by just
52% of the shares.
Id. at 1229.
13. As explained infra notes 64 and 65 and accompanying text, the surveyed data excludes
parent/subsidiary mergers, as well as mergers in connection with divestitures of controlling interests.
14. See infra Part II.A.1.
15. See infra Part II.A.2.
16. See infra Part II.A.3.a.
17. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
18. See infra Part II.A.4.
19. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
20. The seller’s put is the target’s ability to pursue alternative offers while at the same time being
able to, at a minimum, “always put itself to the [buyer] at the [deal] price.” Vineet Bhagwat et al., The
Real Effects of Uncertainty on Merger Activity 2 (Mar. 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2528844. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
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In light of these findings, this Article questions if shareholder voting
is somewhat overplayed in mergers. In particular, a provocative way to
describe shareholders’ role in mergers would be arguing that the costs
borne by the 99% of approved deals in the sample subsidize the benefits
of rejecting the 1% of deals that shareholders considered undesirable. Of
course, that argument would be misguided: it is because of the voting
requirement that only 1% of deals get rejected. In fact, without the
credible threat of shareholder rejection, directors would propose more
deals, including some that shareholders would have wanted to reject if
they could have. Voting works as a safety valve in case of director error
or bad faith: directors anticipate the threat of rejection and present deals
they feel comfortable will get approved.21 I call this the “deal filtering
effect” of voting. Furthermore, voting has also a “premium effect,”
because it pressures directors to increase their bargaining leverage with
the acquirer. Given that a sizeable premium is the best way to forestall
rejection, directors credibly convey the threat of rejection to an acquirer
who will ultimately have to come up with a better price. As a result,
shareholders are presented with deals with more appealing premiums. I
call this the “premium effect” of voting.
Still, this does not mean the current system is perfect. The
opportunity costs in terms of delay in connection with shareholder voting
can jeopardize a company’s operations and endanger deal completion.22
This Article challenges the view that, to attain the policy goal embedded
in the credible threat of shareholder rejection, there is always a need to
have a full-blown vote in each deal. It thus explores the idea to combine
the deterrent element of the credible threat of rejection with a swifter
process for the overwhelming majority of deals in which approval is not
controversial. In particular, I assess three policy initiatives that could be
used to shorten the voting process.23 The first one aims to simplify the
system by having a vote in mergers only if a given percentage of
shareholders requests a vote as a reaction to the specific terms and
conditions of the single deal (I call this feature “vote-on-demand”).24 The
second route, which I call “randomized approval,” is to require voting
only for a fraction of merger transactions and exempt several others from
the requirement. The deals that will ultimately be subject to shareholder
approval would be selected on a random basis after the merger
agreement is signed and announced. Hence, corporate planners would
not know ex ante if their deal is going to be subject to shareholder
21. Sometimes directors overestimate shareholder support and propose subpar deals, which are
the few ones passing with narrow approval margins (or failing altogether). See Timothy R. Burch et
al., Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers Perfunctory?, 33 FIN.
MGMT. 45, 46 (2004).
22. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
23. See infra Part III.B.1.
24. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
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approval and would still have to act as loyal agents to shareholders under
the assumption that approval might be necessary.25 The third proposal is
to shorten the SEC review process and other corporate formalities to get
to a vote (and to completion) more quickly.26
A couple of disclaimers are in order. First, overall, the goal of this
Article is not necessarily to advocate reform, but rather to deconstruct
the current system to better understand it and, possibly, improve it.
Second, I do not intend to make any claim that shareholder voting and
other prerogatives in general should be limited. Simply, I am drawing
attention to the fact that, in the specific field of mergers, voting
essentially acts as a deterrent to bad deals27 and as incentive to better
premiums; but the way it is currently administered also carries some
undesirable overreach. The question is thus whether the benefits of
voting outweigh its costs to the point that it is not worth exploring
solutions that are different from the current regime: Is voting so sacred
that altering some aspects while leaving intact its credible threat function
would impair shareholders’ interests and alter the efficiency of the
market for corporate control? I believe the answer is no. In sum, I have
no intention to constrain, let alone get rid of, shareholder voice in
mergersI just suggest some ways for rationalizing it so that it can best
serve its purpose without unwarranted ripple effects.28
This Article is structured as follows. Part I lays out the legal,
structural, and functional bases underneath the shareholder approval
requirement in mergers. In particular, it describes the most accredited
theories supporting shareholder voice in mergers and introduces the
recent Corwin line of cases awarding a standard-shifting effect to
shareholder approval. In Part II, Subpart A, I provide statistics of merger
approval patterns in the 2006–2015 period and of the actual number of
days to approve a merger. In Part II.B.1, I discuss the plausible
explanations for such patterns: the presence of premiums, the credible
25. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
26. See infra Part III.B.1.c.
27. I refer to a bad, subpar, or inefficient deal throughout the Article from the perspective of target
shareholders only and not of target and acquirer shareholders combined, which is what a basic
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis would call for. Under the latter view, a redistributive acquisition at
the expense of target shareholders would be efficient if the aggregate gains by the acquirer exceed the
losses of the target shareholders. The reason behind looking at the welfare of target shareholders only
is that, when analyzing from a positive law angle the shareholder approval requirement, there are no
indications that corporate laws are protecting anything other than the best interests of the voting
shareholders. Under merger rules, it is solely the target shareholders who always get a say on the
ultimate outcome of the deal and therefore it makes good sense to use as proxy for the desirability of
the acquisition the perspective of the group who gets to vote on it. Cf. Matteo Gatti, It’s My Stock and
I’ll Vote If I Want to: Conflicted Voting by Shareholders in (Hostile) M&A Deals, 47 U. MEM. L. REV.
181, 183 n.207 (2016).
28. By the same token, this Article is agnostic, and its contents not impacted by whatever view
one has, on Bebchuk’s proposal of expanding shareholders’ role in mergers by giving them the power
to initiate mergers; cf. Bebchuk, supra note 10.
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threat of shareholder rejection, the absence of a real choice for
shareholders, and the possible inflation of approval rates because of
arbitrage and/or shareholder conflicts. Part II.B.2 highlights the
potential drawbacks of voting, especially in light of the substantial delay
it imposes on the completion of a merger transaction. In Part III, after
singling out the deal filtering effect and the premium effect as the
ultimate rationales for shareholder approval in mergers (Part III.A), I
explore three initiatives to simplify the voting process: vote-on-demand,
randomized approval, and simplification of the approval timeline,
including revisions to the SEC review process (Part III.B.1). In Part III,
Subpart B.2, I evaluate possible objections to the proposed reforms and
determine that none represents a valid reason for maintaining the status
quo.
I. SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN MERGERS: FROM FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF
THE TRANSACTION STRUCTURE TO SHIELD FROM DIRECTOR LIABILITY
Shareholder approval in connection with M&A transactions is not
an absolute requirement, at least in the form of voting. For instance,
tender offers (especially friendly ones)29 do not structurally call for
shareholder voting and hence acquirers can obtain voting control without
a prior shareholder meeting. Other structures such as mergers and sales
of all or substantially all of the assets generally require formal
shareholder approval from the target shareholders.
A. STRUCTURE
Shareholder voting has long been a necessary step in the approval
process for merger transactions. This is true for both Delaware, and other
jurisdictions across the United States.30 From a historical and structural
perspective, shareholder voting in mergers derives from the old rules
channeling the principle of inviolability of contract: originally, such rules
required a unanimous approval to alter the initial terms of the
investment made by the shareholders.31 During the 1800s, unanimity
29. In the mid-1980s, the evolution of the law governing tender offers and hostile deals in
Delaware led to a system in which, if a bidder does not want to or cannot come to terms with the target
board, the only way to override a target’s resistance through various defensive devices (most notably,
a poison pill), became launching a proxy fight in order to replace the incumbent board of directors
with new directors nominated by the insurgent/bidder who would in turn repeal the defenses (hence,
redeem the poison pill). See Gatti, supra note 27, at 194–98; see also Michal Barzuza, The State of
State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973, 2005 (2009); Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas,
Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 459–61 (2005); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy,
54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 907–09 (2002).
30. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2016); Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 11.04
(2016); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (2016).
31. Carney, supra note 10, at 79–92 (describing the evolution of rules governing fundamental
changes and noting that the more liberal approach towards asset sales was progressively extended to
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went out of favor because it promoted strategic hold-outs at the expense
of consolidations that were considered necessary for technological
innovation:32 It first turned into supermajority and subsequently into
majority of the shares outstanding.33
However, shareholder voting is not an absolute tenet.
First, it mostly covers shareholders of the target corporation and not
those of the acquirer. Under Section 251(f) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law (“DGCL”), a shareholder vote is not necessary if the
certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation is not changed
and the number of shares does not increase more than 20%,34 which
essentially means that cash mergers and medium-to-small acquisitions
via a merger never trigger a shareholder vote in the acquirer.35
Second, even for target companies, shareholder voting has eroded
over time. On the one hand, since the late 1930s, states began passing
short-form merger statutes, which permit to avoid a vote if the acquiring
company already owns a high percentage of target stock (in Delaware the
threshold is 90%).36 On the other hand, more recently, in an effort to
simplify then-current two-step merger structures,37 Delaware reformed
consolidations).
32. Id. at 79 (citing, in particular, technological change to develop the long-line railroad).
33. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
642–44 (2d ed. 1995):
Prior to the 1960s, the great majority of states required a two-thirds vote. This pattern was
broken in 1962 when the Model Business Corporation Act reduced the required percentage
approval to a majority. . . . Delaware reduc[ed] the vote requirement in its statute from twothirds to a majority in 1967.
Id. at 642–43; see also Carney, supra note 10, at 95. The ease for approving mergers was
counterbalanced with the added protection of appraisal rights. Id. at 70–71, 94; Robert B. Thompson,
Exit, Liquidity and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 3–4 (1995).
34. Similarly, in the context of reverse triangular mergers, under the listing rules of the NYSE and
the NASDAQ, see NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c) (2015); NASDAQ STOCK MARKET,
INC., MARKETPLACE RULES, R. 4350(i) (2015), respectively, a shareholder vote at the acquirer is
triggered if more than 20% of the outstanding shares are issued in connection with the merger. Note
that in this case it is not the merger itself that is subject to approval, but rather the share issuance.
35. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 1, at 141 (noting that, given the wide degree of freedom
in structuring an M&A transaction, shareholder voting at the level of acquiring corporations is
basically optional). For analysis, see Mario Becht et al., Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent
Bad Acquisitions? 3 (ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 422, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2443792) (noting that shareholders of U.S. companies vote in limited circumstances and observing
evidence supporting the proposition that value-reducing deals are more likely to be associated with
acquisition structures designed to avoid shareholder approval); Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders’ Put
Option: Counteracting the Acquirer Overpayment Problem, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1018, 1044-49 (2012)
(detailing the various ways to structure transactions in order to bypass voting of the acquirer
shareholders of Delaware corporations).
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2016). This situation is typically seen in a two-step tender
offer/short-form merger in Delaware; Section 253 allows for a majority owner with at least 90%
ownership to perform a cash-out merger without shareholder approval.
37. For quite a while between the mid-1990s and 2006, statutory mergers happened to be a
practitioner’s favorite for negotiated public M&A transactions and shareholder voting was a necessary
passage. Back in the 1990s, a circuit split emerged over the best price rule in tender offers (SEC Rule
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its merger statute by introducing the so-called medium-form merger
under Section 251(h) of the DGCL, which exempts from the voting
requirement two-step mergers if, among other things, following a
14d-10). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2017). The rule is promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d), amended by the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(2012)). Some circuits interpreted it quite extensively so as
to capture parachute payments to directors and officers. See Rusty A. Fleming, A Case of “When”
Rather than “What:” Tender Offers Under the Williams Act and the All Holders and Best Price Rules,
27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 286 (2003) (noting that if one takes such payments into account, the per-share
price of an offer drastically increases and, as a result of the best price rule, so does the aggregate
acquisition price). As a result, mergers were considered a safer structure to conduct an M&A
transaction. David Offenberg & Christo A. Pirinsky, How Do Acquirers Choose Between Mergers and
Tender Offers?, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 331, 348 (2015) (describing the effects of the best price rule and its
effect on how a bidder plans an acquisition approach); see also Latham & Watkins LLP, SEC Proposes
Amendments to the Best Price Rule (Jan. 18, 2006), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/m-anda-deal-commentary-january-2006b. However, to solve the uncertainties surrounding the circuit split
and revitalize tender offers, in 2006 the SEC promulgated amendments to Rule 14d-10, which clarified
that such payments are outside the scope of the best price rule if certain conditions are present. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N NOS. 3454684, AMENDMENTS TO THE TENDER OFFER BEST-PRICE RULES (2006). As a
result, tender offers became popular once again, especially because of their speedier timetable that
allows a buyer to obtain control much sooner and therefore to be less at risk of being outbid by a rival
offer. See Offenberg & Pirinsky, supra, at 333 (reporting that a tender offer takes on average
seventy-three days less to close than a merger and arguing that a tender offers is faster because of a
less demanding regime under federal securities regulation, antitrust law, and financing requirements);
see also John C. Coates IV, Mergers, Acquisitions and Restructuring: Types, Regulation, and
Patterns of Practice, 36 (European Corporate Governance Institute (“ECGI”), Working Paper No. 260,
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2463251 (“Because M&A law does not apply equally to all
methods of pursuing a given transaction, opportunities arise for M&A to be structured to reduce the
effect of or avoid some of these laws. . . . [I]n the US, we see the emergence of the tender offer as a
mechanism for hostile takeovers in the 1980s, followed by its use in negotiated acquisitions (followed
by squeeze-out mergers), to reduce the time needed to obtain control, while ensuring 100%
ownership.”).
However, while a standalone tender offer serves well the purpose of obtaining control faster, an
acquirer would still need to go through a formal merger procedure to ensure all minority shareholders
who hold out to the tender offer are pushed out of the corporation. Therefore, to quicken the lengthy
procedure of mergers (disclosures, SEC review, calling and holding a shareholder meeting, tabulating
the results, and so forth), buyers aimed at avoiding a vote altogether by obtaining a minimum of 90%
of the stock of the target in order to effect a short-form merger under Section 253 of the DGCL. Given
that 90% is a significant threshold to obtain, buyers engineered a way to get to 90% through so-called
“top-up” options: “target companies issue enough new shares to get an acquirer to 90% and state law
takes care of the rest.” Liz Hoffman, Top-Up Option, We Hardly Knew Ye, LAW360 (Apr. 26, 2013,
5:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/436259/top-up-option-we-hardly-knew-ye (describing
the top-up option mechanics and mentioning that top-up options “spread quickly[: b]y 2004,
one-third of tender offers included a top-up, according to MergerMetrics. By 2008, it was virtually 100
percent.”). The top-up option was admittedly a complex procedure (“The top-up option is an
engineered fix, and it works pretty well, but in an ideal world, we wouldn’t need it,” said Mark Morton
of Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, one of the Delaware lawyers who recommends changes to the
corporate code each year to the state Legislature. “[Section] 251(h) tries to create that world.”) Id.
Because of such complexity, in 2013 the Delaware legislature relaxed the voting requirement in
mergers by introducing, with Section 251(h), the so-called medium-form merger. H.B. 127, 147th Gen.
Assemb., 79 Del. Laws, c. 72, § 6 (2013), amending 8 Del. C. 1953, § 251. Section 251(h) was
subsequently amended on July 25, 2014, with changes that went into effect on August 1, 2014. See also
Afra Afsharipour, Deal Structure and Minority Shareholders, in COMPARATIVE TAKEOVER
REGULATION, GLOBAL AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 35, 46-48 (Umakanth Varottil et al. eds., 2018).
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first-step tender offer, the acquirer has a number of shares at least equal
to the “percentage of the shares of stock of [the target] corporation . . .
that . . . , absent [Section 251(h) of the DGCL], would be required to
adopt the agreement of merger by [the DGCL] . . . and by the certificate
of incorporation of such . . . corporation.”38 So the old idea that an
acquirer cannot force a shareholder out for cash without a vote is no
longer true in today’s legal landscape.
B. FUNCTION: TRADITIONAL THEORIES
From a functional perspective, scholars normally mention a few
rationales justifying shareholder approval in connection with mergers.39
According to a traditional view, a shareholder vote in mergers is
necessary because mergers are a fundamental alteration of the original
investment contract: In other words, these decisions are so important
that directors should not decide alone.40 This argument is no longer
accepted as a plausible rationale. Scholars point out that there are several
other decisions in the life of a corporation, so-called “bet-the-company”
operational decisions, which are arguably as critical and fundamental as
a merger, yet do not require a shareholder vote.41
Another recurring explanation is that shareholders decide on
mergers because those transactions do not merely involve a pure
business decision, but are essentially an investment decision, which
should belong to those who will bear its effects, that is, the
shareholders.42 However, this theory does not satisfactorily explain why
shareholders have voting rights in sell-side transactions only (buy-side
transactions are investment decisions as well, which arguably carry

38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2016). This section is subject to limitations: for example, the
procedure cannot be used for transactions involving and interested buyer under Section 203 of the DGCL.
39. Part I.B draws on WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 466–68 (4th ed. 2016). See generally Afsharipour, supra note 37, at 46-48.
40. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
79 (1991) (“All statutes provide, however, that in situations of ‘extraordinary’ actionfundamental
corporate changesthe issue must be submitted to shareholders,” but also qualifying such a statement
by adding that “[t]his rule . . . helps reduce agency costs.”); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
414 (1986) (“The basic idea underlying the corporate law provisions on sales and mergers seems to be
that sudden, deliberate (that is, manager-initiated), major or ‘organic’ corporate changes that affect
shareholder interests ought to be approved or consented to by some majority of the shareholders.”).
41. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 39, at 467 (citing “Microsoft’s decision to develop
Microsoft Windows; or Boeing’s decision to develop the 747 wide-body jet,” and adding that
“shareholders generally lack the ability and information to make them relative to the alternative
decision maker, the board and top managers.”).
42. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 1416 (1976).
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bigger risks for them)43 and, more importantly, why shareholders cannot
decide alone but still need directors to initiate the merger procedure.44
A third, more satisfying theory considers shareholder voting in
mergers a protection against potential director abuses in a typical final
period situation.45 As Black and Kraakman point out, the “law supports
bilateral decisionmaking by shareholders and the board on decisions that
are fundamental to the corporation’s identity and existence, especially
decisions that place managers and directors in a final period problem,
where agency costs are likely to be high.”46 In other words, the vote
operates as a protection against the peculiar conflicts (because of
potential side payments, career opportunities, and the like) faced by

43. For managerial abuses at buyers, see generally Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of
Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 212 (1986) (arguing that bidders always overpay for targets);
Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 599–600 (1989) (noting
how bidders pay too much for target companies and that this phenomenon is something acquirer
shareholders expect). For the policy proposal that all acquisitions, buy- and sell-side, irrespective of
size and transactional form, should be subject to a shareholder vote, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating
the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate
Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1269–72 (1984).
44. Thompson & Edelman, supra note 1, at 139 (“[i]f [the board] does not wish for a merger to
happen, it is not obligated to put the matter before the shareholders, hardly an indication of
shareholder primacy.”).
45. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 30, at 720–21:
[I]n a situation where parties expect to have repeated transactions, the recognition that a
party who cheats in one transaction will be penalized by the other party in subsequent
transactions reduces the incentive to cheat. However, when a transaction is the last (or
only) in a seriesthat is, the final periodthe incentive to cheat reappears because, by
definition, the penalty for doing so has disappeared. In the context of an acquisition
nothing stops target management from selling out the shareholders in return for side
payments from the acquiring company because target management, by definition, will no
longer be subject to the constraints of the product, capital and control markets after the
acquisition. Perhaps more importantly, if the remaining professional careers of target
management are getting short, the size of the side payment may more than compensate
them from any ex post penalty imposed by the market for managers. . . . [Target
companies] are subject to final period problems and therefore cannot rely on management
for protection, and require, instead, the barrier of a shareholders vote as a protection
against management.
46. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 559 (2002); see also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 39, at 468
(mentioning special agency problems when incumbents potentially face a final period); Thompson &
Edelman, supra note 1, at 141 (noting that in mergers “voting by shareholders is best explained as error
correction of managers rather than as an inherent shareholder right to participate”).
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management in negotiated deals.47 I analyze this aspect more in depth
throughout this Article.48
C. CONSEQUENCES: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW-SHIFTING EFFECT
A recent line of cases that emerged from the Corwin decision offers
a new viewpoint for analyzing shareholder voting in mergers. Under
Corwin, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a Chancery Court decision
establishing that “when a transaction not subject to the entire fairness
standard is approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the
disinterested stockholders, the business judgment rule applies.”49
Among the crucial factors for the decision, Chief Justice Leo Strine
mentioned that “[w]hen the real parties in interestthe disinterested
equity ownerscan easily protect themselves at the ballot box by simply
voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard of review promises
more costs to stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions
on risk-taking than it promises in terms of benefits to them.”50 According
to Chief Justice Strine, the effect of shareholder approval on judicial
standard of review is not a novelty. In an extended footnote, Strine points
out that “there is . . . precedent under Delaware law for the proposition
that the approval of the disinterested stockholders in a fully informed,
47. This point was first made clear in the seminal M&A article by Henry G. Manne, Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 118 (1965):
[T]he managers are in a position to claim almost the full market value of control, since they
have it in their power to block the merger by voting against it. When we find incumbents
recommending a control change, it is generally safe to assume that some side payment is
occurring. . . . The most obvious kind of side payment to managers is a position within the
new structure either paying a salary or making them privy to valuable market information.
This arrangement, easily established with mergers, can look like normal business
expediency, since the argument can always be made that the old management provides
continuity and a link with the past experience of the corporation.
For more recent accounts of the many conflicts that may arise in friendly deals, see Coates, supra note
supra note 37, at 11 (mentioning, among other things, that “[f]iduciaries may favor one bidder over
another, not in return for an explicit quid pro quo (for example, in the form of a payment) but to curry
good will in the hope of obtaining post-deal employment, or perhaps out of malice towards a bidder or
gratitude for some past favor”); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
58–59 (2012):
Although the tension between shareholders and managers is perhaps most obvious in
hostile takeovers, . . . similar conflicts of interest arise in negotiated acquisitions. To
purchase the board’s cooperation the bidder may offer side payments to management, such
as an equity stake in the surviving entity, employment or non-competition contracts,
substantial severance payments, continuation of existing fringe benefits or other
compensation arrangements. Although it is undoubtedly rare for side payments to be so
large as to materially affect the price the bidder would otherwise be able to pay target
shareholders, side payments may affect management’s decision making by causing them to
agree to an acquisition price lower than that which could be obtained from hard bargaining
or open bidding.
48. In particular, see infra Part II.B.1.b and Part III.A.
49. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 309 (Del. 2015).
50. Id. at 313.
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uncoerced vote that was required to consummate a transaction has the
effect of invoking the business judgment rule.”51
Subsequent decisions, namely Singh v. Attenborough52 and In re
Volcano,53 expanded the scope of judicial deference to shareholder voice.
The former clarified that when the business judgment rule applies, the
only instance in which directors might be liable for damages is under the
waste doctrine,54 while the latter extended the ruling of Corwin to
two-step mergers under Section 251(h) of the DGCL.55 This trend of
expanding Corwin has continued with several pronouncements by the
Court of Chancery.56
Corwin and its progeny put shareholder decisionmaking at the
center stage, something that is not new in Delaware case law but in fact
goes back to Unocal,57 and well before then to cleansing statutes for
conflicted transactions.58 An informed, uncoerced, and unconflicted vote
by the shareholders approving a merger shifts the standard of review to

51. Id. at 309 n.19.
52. See supra note 7.
53. See supra note 7.
54. Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d.151, 152 (Del. 2016).
55. In the Volcano decision, the Chancery Court held that the acceptance of a first-step tender
offer by a majority fully informed, disinterested, uncoerced shareholders has the same cleansing effect
of a fully informed, uncoerced vote by disinterested shareholders in connection with a merger. In re
Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 738–41 (Del. Ch. 2016).
56. In particular, in Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25,
2016), Vice-Chancellor Slight stated that, absent a controlling stockholder, the effect of disinterested
stockholder approval of the merger is review under the business judgment rule (which the court
labeled “irrebuttable”), “even if the transaction might otherwise have been subject to the entire
fairness standard due to conflicts faced by individual directors.” Id. at *1, *8. This decision on the
applicability of Corwin was seemingly endorsed by the more recent Solera case (In re Solera Holdings,
Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11524-CB, 2017 WL 57839 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2017)), which also clarified
several additional interpretative points and expanded Corwin’s breadth, including that plaintiffs have
the burden of pleading that the vote was not fully informed and that there is quite a high standard for
establishing the materiality of claims to challenge the merger disclosures.
57. In the case that started modern takeover law, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court granted target companies the power to defend,
because, among other things, bidders could still use a proxy fight to challenge defenses. In the words
of Delaware judges, “[i]f the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected
representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.” Id. at
959. Scholars do agree that with this decision shareholder voice through a vote was put at the center
stage. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1075 (1990); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A
Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993).
58. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144(a)(2) (providing for (i) a safe harbor from immediate
voidability of an interested transaction and (ii) narrower judicial review on the directors’ conduct if,
among other things, the transaction is approved by the stockholders); cf. Marciano v. Nakash, 535
A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (“Approval by fully-informed . . . disinterested stockholders under
section 144(a)(2), permits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues
of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the party attacking the transaction.”); cf. Thompson &
Edelman, supra note 1, at 133 (“[I]n the corporate sphere, a vote may act as a way to cleanse behavior
by an agent that would otherwise be suspect.”).
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the business judgment rule even in transactions that trigger Revlon: a
vote having such characteristics has the effect of (de facto) ratifying the
transaction for liability purposes. Following the closing of a merger,
when the dispute simply revolves around directors’ liability only,
heightened standards of review that are typical of the takeover field, such
as Unocal and Revlon, do not even apply. The rationale is that because
shareholders have approved, why should there be a liability? The
Delaware judiciary is essentially suggesting that shareholder voting does
a much better job than litigation in protecting dispersed shareholders
against director abuses in the M&A context because shareholders are
better decision makers than a judge if certain conditions are present.59
When shareholders make effective use of the franchise (that is, the vote
is fully-informed, uncoerced, and comes from disinterested
shareholders), litigation becomes unwarranted. All in all, Corwin and its
progeny follow a recent trend in Delaware law that seeks to tame
litigation abuses in connection with M&A transactions.60
I come back to further analyze this doctrine in Part III.61
II. HOW RELEVANT IS SHAREHOLDER ACTION IN MERGERS?
A. VOTING OUTCOMES AND TIMING FOR MERGER APPROVALS: AN
ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEALS
In this Part, I survey shareholder voting in connection with mergers,
both in terms of patterns of voting outcomes and timing required to reach
59. A scholarly article by Vice-Chancellor Laster predating the Corwin case describes the
doctrinal foundation behind this approach in the following terms:
When a stockholder plaintiff claims that a corporate decision constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty, a court applying Delaware law searches for an independent, disinterested,
and sufficiently informed decision maker. If one exists, then the court defers to the decision
that the qualified decision maker made. Only in the absence of a qualified decision maker
will the court assume that role for itself.
J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1443, 1443 (2014).
60. In 2014, 95% of publicly announced mergers were litigated (they were roughly half that size
only a decade earlier). See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform,
93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 579 (2015). Given that merger litigation normally ends up in settlements that do
not benefit shareholders, but rather enrich plaintiff attorneys significantly, the corporate litigation
system in Delaware has become subject to criticism over the years. Starting in 2015, the Delaware
judiciary responded, on the one hand, by clarifying that in the future it will not approve settlement
without substantial benefits to shareholders (In re Trulia, 129. A.3d 884 (Del. 2015)) and, on the other
hand, with Corwin, by making the bulk of post-closing litigation involving mergers subject to the more
lenient business judgment rule; cf. Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation
1, 3–4 (European Corporate Governance Institute (“ECGI”) Law Working Paper No. 375, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922121 (noting that the Delaware legislature
has also taken steps to reduce abuses such as multi-forum litigation, by authorizing issuers to adopt
forum-selection bylaws).
61. See infra Part III.B.2.a.iii.
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a vote. The basic dataset, which originates from FactSet Sharkrepellent,
reports on approval percentages for all mergers and asset deals that
directors submitted for shareholder approval and the vote occurred (or
was scheduled to occur)62 in the period from January 1, 2006, to
December 31, 2015. In such a dataset, the target is a domestic public
entity whose stock at the time of the vote was part of the Russell 1000 or
Russell 2000 indexes63 (“FSSR Dataset”). Subparts 1 through 3 report on
voting outcomes by analyzing the few instances of rejection (Part II.A.1),
the few proxy campaigns to vote down a merger deal (Part II.A.2), the
generally very high approval percentages (Part II.A.3.a), and lack of
correlation between such percentages and the premiums paid to
shareholders (Part II.A.3.b). Part II.A.4 surveys deals that were voted in
2014 and 2015 to determine how long it normally takes to get from deal
announcement to shareholder approval.
1. Extremely Low Number of Rejected Transactions
From the original sample of 1067 deals contained in the FSSR
Dataset, I do not take into account deals that fall under any of the
following categories: (i) sales of assets, (ii) mergers between parents and
subsidiaries, and (iii) mergers in connection with sales of control by one
or more controlling stockholders. I make such exclusions because the
focus of this Article is to report on mergers whose voting outcome is
uncertain ex ante and in which shareholder voting could make a
difference. The focus is thus on mergers in connection with acquisitions
of companies whose control is contestable in the market (irrespective of
whether any such merger triggers Revlon duties).64 I am not interested
62. To be sure, the dataset is comprised of deals for which directors called a shareholder meeting,
and does not include deals that, for one reason or another, were abandoned prior to calling the
meeting.
63. Hence they belong to the Russell 3000 Index, which is comprised of both.
64. Revlon duties often, but not always, appear in connection with deals involving a contestable
company. For starters, it is a Delaware law doctrine applicable to Delaware companies. As far as other
states are concerned, some follow it, while others do not. See Barzuza, supra note 29, at 1982–85
(2009) (noting that although Delaware has, in the context of the sale of the company, or of its control,
established enhanced fiduciary duties, some other states reject such duties and instead allow for other
constituency statutes and more accommodating pill statutes). More importantly, not all deals targeting
a Delaware contestable company are relevant for Revlon purposes: Its duties are triggered in limited
circumstances, for example, if a company is put on sale (either in a stock or in an asset deal) or if a
break-up is inevitable. Deals that are not subject to Revlon are stock deals involving a combination “of
equals,” which does not result in a change of control of the target company. See Paramount Comm’cns
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–48 (1993) (finding Revlon would not apply when the target
company gets acquired by a company of a relatively similar size that does not have a controlling
stockholder who would otherwise end up controlling the combined company: If the control of the
target combined with the other entity would continue to stay fluid in the market, stockholders of the
target would not face a loss in their voting rights and therefore Revlon would not apply). The Revlon
ruling establishes an enhanced standard of conduct for directors and officers of a Delaware company
that compels them to maximize value for the benefit of shareholders in the sale of the company above
the protection of interests of other stakeholders. Specifically, under Revlon the role of directors is
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in mergers between parents and subsidiaries and mergers whereby one
or more stockholders are divesting a controlling stake because the
dynamics of voting are dramatically different. In the absence of a
majority-of-the-minority
condition,
which
is
optional
in
parent-subsidiary mergers, obtaining shareholder approval is never
problematic because the parent company has enough votes to make the
merger pass.65 Similarly, in mergers in connection with a divestiture of a
controlling interest, the outcome of the vote is almost never uncertain
because the exiting controlling stockholder is expected, and very often
contractually bound, to support the transaction. Given that in these
so-called “done deals” shareholder approval is either not an issue or is
extremely likely, such mergers lack probative value.66
As a result, the sample I use for observations on rejected
transactions is comprised of 907 mergers (“2006-2015 Sample”). Table I
lists, for each year in the 2006–2015 period, (i) the number of mergers
comprising the 2006–2015 Sample, (ii) the percentage of approved
mergers, (iii) the number and percentage of failed mergers, (iv) the
transformed “from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.” Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
65. Even if the merger does have a majority-of-the-minority condition, because the pool of shares
that are relevant for the approval is significantly smaller than in a normal merger, it would not be
appropriate to consider the approval data comparable to all other mergers in which control is
potentially contestable in the market. Under Delaware law, mergers between parents and subsidiaries
trigger an enhanced level of scrutiny of the underlying transaction, which goes under the name of
entire fairness and requires the defendant directors and controlling shareholder to show both “fair
dealing” and “fair price.” Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Under Delaware case
law, the burden of proving that the transaction meets such criteria, which the entire fairness standard
initially puts on the defendants because of the conflicted nature of the transaction, can be shifted back
to the plaintiff if certain procedural safeguards are followed: Namely, the transaction is either
negotiated by an independent committee with broad negotiating powers (inclusive of the power to
appoint separate counsel and financial advisor, as well as to say no to the transaction) or is approved
by a majority of the minority of shareholders of the subsidiary. Compare Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns
Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (clarifying that an effective independent committee would only
shift the burden of proof, which in the specific case did not happen because the independent committee
faced a retributive threat by parentto launch a tender offer at a lower price if the committee kept
rejecting it termsthus impairing its judgment and negotiating abilities) with Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (“approval of a merger . . . by an informed vote of a majority of the
minority shareholders, while not a legal prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the
merger entirely to the plaintiffs.”).
66. In that spirit, I carve out from the sample all mergers that are accompanied by voting or
supporting agreements covering 35% or more of the voting stock, unless such agreements contain outs
for shareholders if directors change their recommendation, in which case the target remains
potentially contestable pending shareholder approval. Although the cut-off is admittedly arbitrary,
any commitment to vote shares in excess of 35% makes it extremely improbable that the merger is
voted down, as corporate planners will only need an extra 15% of voting stock in support out of a
remaining float of 65% (so they would need approximately need 2.3 out of every ten votes remaining).
Because of this carve-out, mergers such as the acquisitions by Disney of Pixar and Marvel (each with
a voting agreement covering 40% and approximately 37% of the voting stock, respectively) are not in
the sample and disregarded from observation.
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number and percentage of failed mergers as a result of an actual rejection
through a vote, and (v) the number and percentage of failed mergers as a
result of a shareholder opposition in general (rejected via vote or
otherwise).
Shareholders approved an astonishing 98.68% of 907 mergers
submitted to a vote in the 2006–2015 period.67 Only twelve mergers
(1.32%) failed to be approved: of these twelve, seven were abandoned
prior to an actual vote, while only five (0.55%) were voted down by
shareholders. Based on publicly available information, five out of the
seven deals terminated prior to a shareholder vote were abandoned in
anticipation of a likely rejection by shareholders, which brings the total
number of mergers that were de facto rejected by shareholders in the
observation period to ten (1.1%). In four years during the observation
period2009, 2013, 2014, and 2015100% of the proposed mergers
were approved. The years with the lowest passing rates were 2008 and
2010 with 95.89% and 95.12% respectively.

67. This is consistent with some prior studies. See Burch et al., supra note 21, 45–46 (looking at
acquiring firm voting patterns). But see Offenberg & Pirinsky, supra note 37, at 338, who report that,
from their 2007–2012 sample of 1033 domestic mergers with a public target, the completion rate was
78.9%, which contrasts with the passing rate reported here (98.68%). Similarly, reporting a 22%
termination rate, see Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 6. There can be a few explanations for these
discrepancies. The 2006–2015 sample that I use here reports only on mergers involving a Russell
3000 target company. This is why the total sample for the 2006–2015 period (907) under my sample
is less numerous than Offenberg and Pirinsky’s sample, which collects data from a much shorter time
horizon (six years versus ten). The sample by Bhagwat et al. differs even more drastically as they count
private targets and subsidiaries as well and such companies happen to dominate the sample: the total
number of deals in their sample averages 692 per month, of which 638 are private or subsidiaries.
Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 12. Also, my dataset is comprised only of deals for which directors
actually submitted the merger to a vote, see supra note 62 and accompanying text. It is plausible that,
for whatever reasons, certain mergers were abandoned shortly after announcement or failed to close
after they obtained shareholder approval: In such cases, those mergers would not be captured in my
sample. Finally, the sample I use here focuses on contestable companies only: As noted, from the
original FSSR Sample, I carve out parent/subsidiary mergers, as well as mergers in connection with a
divestiture of a controlling interest.

GATTI-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

854

4/6/2018 4:01 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:835

Table I
Announced and Failed Mergers Involving a Russell 3000
Domestic Target in the 2006–2015 Period
Year

Number
of
Proposed
Mergers

Percentage of
Approved
Mergers

Failed Mergers
(Percentage)

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

141
183
72
33
82
83
69
91
64
86
907

99.29%
98.91%
95.89%
100%
95.12%
98.8%
98.55%
100%
100%
100%
98.68%

1 (0.71%)
2 (1.09%)
3 (4.11%)1
0
4 (4.88%)2
1 (1.2%)3
1 (1.45%)4
0
0
0
12 (1.32%)

Mergers
Failed as a
Result of a
Reject Vote
(%)

1 (0.71%)
2 (1.09%)
0
0
2 (2.44%)
0
0
0
0
0
5 (0.55%)

Mergers Failed as a
Result of
Shareholder
Opposition (i.e., Vote
or Otherwise) (%)

1 (0.71%)
2 (1.09%)
2 (2.74%)1
0
4 (4.88%)2
1 (1.2%)4
0
0
0
0
10 (1.1%)

(1) None of these planned mergers went to an actual vote, but were abandoned beforehand by the
parties to the merger agreement: Bronco Drilling Corp. cancelled a special meeting of shareholders
when it became apparent that there would not be enough shareholder support to move forward
with the transaction; The Alpha Natural Resources / Cliff Natural Resources merger was
terminated citing economic uncertainty in late 2008 (but it was rumored that buyer was also not
likely to obtain shareholder approval); Constellation Energy terminated the merger agreement to
be sold to a rival bidder (EDF).
(2) Of these four, two mergers (acquisitions of Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group and Dynegy) failed
to obtain the required majority and two (acquisitions of CPI International and Javelin
Pharmaceuticals) were abandoned before a shareholder vote took place, one (CPI International)
out of mutual consent for loss of interest in the combination by the target (buyer apparently lost a
large governmental contract) and the other (Javelin Pharmaceuticals) because of competitive
bidding.
(3) The merger (acquisition of Transatlantic Holdings by Allied World) was abandoned before a
shareholder vote took place because shareholders pressed to sell in a competitive auction.
(4) The merger (acquisition of Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack) was abandoned before a shareholder
vote took place because the buyer took issue with lower than expected earnings.

2. Extremely Low Number of Mergers Contested or Disputed by
Shareholders
Not only are shareholder rejections (actual or anticipated) very
limited (1.1% during the ten-year observation period), but it is also rare
for merger approvals to escalate to contested or disputed votes. In terms
of merger-related proxy contests, Georgeson reports, in its Annual
Corporate Governance Review in the years 2006 through 2015,68 very
68. See GEORGESON, INC., ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 45 (2006); GEORGESON, INC.,
ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 48–49 (2007); GEORGESON, INC., ANNUAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REVIEW 46–47 (2008); GEORGESON, INC., ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 50
(2010); GEORGESON, INC., ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 50 (2011); GEORGESON, INC.,
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few cases of opposition to a merger. Shareholders contested only
seventeen mergers, thirteen of which escalated to an actual proxy
contest, and the remaining four were included because of some disputed
elements in the process.69 Table I.A in the Appendix lists all such cases.70
The very low number of contested merger votes (of seventeen in
total, thirteen were formal contests) is quite at odds with the overall
activist climate of the last ten to fifteen years.71 In fact, for the same
2006–2015 period, the Georgeson Reports list an aggregate of 796
disputed votes, 397 of which escalated to an actual formal contest.72 Of
the thirteen mergers that experienced a formal proxy contest,
management won seven (and so the underlying mergers were ultimately
approved). Four campaigns were abandoned before a vote could actually
take place and in such cases the merger was approved. Only in two cases
(GFI and Chiquita Brands Int’l) did the dissident win. All in all, of the
seventeen instances in which there was opposition to a merger, fourteen
ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 58–59 (2013); GEORGESON, INC., ANNUAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REVIEW 56–57 (2014); GEORGESON, INC., ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 60,
63 (2015).
69. This finding is consistent with Yair Listokin, Corporate Voting versus Market Price Setting,
11 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 608, 616 (2009). In the years 2000 through 2006, Listokin collected only eight
instances of proxy contests in connection with mergers, which he described as “a tiny fraction of total
U.S. mergers and acquisition activity.” His study collected a total of ninety-seven proxy contests in
that same period. Similarly, in a study analyzing merger activity between 2005 and 2012, Fisch et al.,
supra note 60, at 581-82 found only fifteen instances of mergers obtaining a negative recommendation
by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the most prominent proxy advisory firm.
70. Note that, to compile its lists, Georgeson follows criteria that do not match those of the FSSR
Dataset. Georgeson reports proxy fights in connection with mergers of corporations that are outside
of the Russell 3000 Index; it also reports on mergers in which one of the parties is not a domestic
entity: as a result, three mergers listed in Table I.A for being mentioned in the Georgeson Reports do
not actually appear in the FSSR Dataset. As to the merger between Pamrapo Bancorp and BCB
Bancorp, neither company was a Russell 3000 corporation. The mergers between Chiquita Brands
Int’l and Eyffes, and between PartnerRe and Axis were not entirely domestic (Eyffes and PartnerRe
are foreign private issuers).
71. This is consistent with prior studies. See Burch et al., supra note 21, at 46 (looking at acquirer
firm voting patterns and arguing that “voting shareholders may view acquisition proposals less
skeptically than they do other non-routine management proposals.”).
72. The breakdown is as follows:
Year
Contested Solicitations
Other Publicized Disputes
2006
31
13
2007
46
22
2008
56
20
2009
57
20
2010
35
22
2011
20
22
2012
34
53
2013
37
51
2014
45
44
2015
36
132
Totals
397 (A)
399 (B)
Overall Total
796
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mergers passed, two (again: GFI and Chiquita Brands Int’l) failed and
one (PartnerRe) was terminated.73
One takeaway is that shareholders know a bad deal when they see
one: they do not need an activist to tell them to turn down a merger (and
activists save their efforts for harder battles). After all, the merger price
on the table is a pretty straightforward indicator that makes it somewhat
easy to decide in which direction to vote, much easier than when
shareholders have to vote on some “rules-of-the-game” resolutions (for
example, having a staggered board or not, granting proxy access or not,
which are some of the usual darlings of activists).74
3. Analyzing Approval Percentages
a. Mergers Pass with High Percentages of Shares
Approving
As the ensuing analysis illustrates, not only were mergers almost
always approved, they were also voted by significant majorities. I analyze
a smaller sample here: from the 907 mergers in the 2006–2015 Sample,
I disregard mergers in the 2006–2009 period because the FSSR Dataset
does not contain sufficient information on approval percentages, which
for those years are reported only for a limited number of deals. For a
coherent dataset, I analyze approval percentages with respect to
companies that have homogeneous approval requirements.75 Because
companies in the 2006–2015 Sample are mostly from Delaware, and
Delaware’s statutory approval requirement is a majority of the
outstanding shares, I focus primarily on mergers in which the target is
subject to such requirement.76 Therefore, the main analysis of approval
patterns is from the following sample: (i) mergers from the 2006–2015
sample that were approved in the 2010–2015 period, (ii) for which there
is information on approval percentages in the FSSR Dataset, and (iii)

73. Note incidentally that, for one reason or another, none of these three mergers are included in
the 2006–2015 samplefor instance, in the GFI merger, a voting agreement aggregated shares above
the 35% cut-off (37.8%, to be precise) and therefore the deal was discarded from the sample. See supra
note 66.
74. See infra notes 108, 241, and 243.
75. Corporate laws in the U.S. have different rules concerning quorums and majority required to
approve a merger. In certain states, like Delaware and California, a merger must be approved by a
majority of the outstanding shares carrying voting rights. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (2016); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2016). Other states, like Texas and Ohio, adopted supermajority requirements
(two-thirds of the outstanding shares carrying voting rights). See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.364
(2016); OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.78 (2016).
76. Companies falling into such a category are (i) Delaware companies subject to the statutory
requirement (i.e., which have not opted into a supermajority requirement), (ii) companies in other
jurisdictions with the same approval requirement of Delaware and that have not contracted out of it,
and (iii) companies in jurisdictions having a different statutory requirement that have opted into the
majority of the outstanding shares approval requirement. See supra note 75.
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which required an approval by a majority of the outstanding shares
(“Majority Approval Sample”). The Majority Approval Sample is
comprised of 392 mergers. However, for comparison purposes, this
Article also considers approval patterns for mergers with an approval
requirement of two-thirds77 of the outstanding shares (the “2/3 Approval
Sample”).78 The 2/3 Approval Sample contains forty-two mergers.
Table II lists average approval percentages in relation to the
aggregate numbers of shares outstanding, broken down in median,
mean, standard deviation, 25th and 75th percentiles for both the
Majority Approval Sample and the 2/3 Approval Sample.79 Fig. I
graphically shows median, 25th and 75th percentiles for the period for
the Majority Approval Sample. In each of the observed years the median
for the Majority Approval Sample is always above the 75% mark, and
even mergers that rank lower in terms of approval numbers received
quite high approval percentages. In each year of the observation period,
the 25th percentile is above (and, but for 2011, well above) the 70% mark.
Unsurprisingly, the approval numbers in the 2/3 Approval Sample are
higher given the higher required majority.

77. Similar to supra note 76, companies falling into such a category are (i) companies subject to
the statutory requirement (i.e., which have not opted into a lower majority or into a supermajority),
and (ii) companies in jurisdictions having a different statutory requirement that have opted into the
2/3 approval requirement.
78. To be clear, the 2/3 Approval Sample is comprised of (i) mergers from the 2006–2015 sample
that were approved in the 2010–2015 period, (ii) for which there is information on approval
percentages in the FSSR Dataset, and (iii) which required an approval by two thirds of the outstanding
shares.
79. Table II contains disaggregated data for each year in the 2010–2015 period, but only for the
Majority Approval Sample, because the limited number of observed mergers in the 2/3 Sample (42)
would not offer reliable information on a disaggregated basis.
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Fig. I
Merger Approval Percentages - Outstanding Shares (Majority Approval
Sample)
Median, 25th, 75th Percentile

85%
83%
81%
79%
77%
75%
73%
71%
69%
67%
65%
2010

2011

Median

2012

2013

2014

25th Percentile

2015

Total
Sample

75th Percentile

Table II
Average Approval PercentagesOutstanding Shares
(Majority Approval Sample and 2/3 Approval Sample;
2010-15 Period)
Year

No. Of
Observed
Mergers

Avg.
Approval
% Outst.
Shares
Mean
73.85%
75%
77.29%
77%
76.99%
77.26%

Standard
Deviation

Approval
% Outst.
Shares
25th Pctile

Approval %
Outst.
Shares
75th Pctile

56
72
59
73
56
76

Avg.
Approval
% Outst.
Shares
Median
75.87%
75.14%
77.58%
77.51%
78.16%
78.22%

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total
Majority
Approval
Sample
2/3
Approval
Sample

10.67%
8.91%
8.47%
7.81%
7.49%
6.77%

71.94%
70.13%
73.47%
72.89%
72.71%
73.46%

79.40%
80.33%
83.3%
82.44%
82.32%
82.17%

392

77.17%

76.28%

8.41%

72.15%

81.68%

42

80.3%

79.8%

5.61%

76.85%

84.06%

Table III describes the lower tail of approval percentages in the
Majority Approval Sample (per year and in the aggregate). The 5th
percentile is roughly at the 62% level. Only 3.83% of mergers in the
sample (15 out of 392 deals) have received less than 60% of shares
approving. Of those, only two (or 0.5% of the sample) failed to be
approved.
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Table III
Lower Tail of Approval PercentagesOutstanding Shares
(Majority Approval Sample)
Year

Total
No. Of
Mergers

Approval
% Outst.
Shares
25th Pctile

10th
Pctile

5th
Pctile

3rd
Lowest

2nd
Lowest

Min.

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total
Sample

56
72
59
73
56
76
392

71.94%
70.13%
73.47%
72.89%
72.71%
73.46%
72.15%

65.23%
63.71%
63.61%
66.99%
66.68%
66.04%
65.53%

55.49%
58.81%
60.2%
64.09%
64.84%
65.06%
61.9%

51%
57%
60.2%
59.81%
64.78%
64.49%
50.85%

41.16%
52.18%
59.52%
58.14%
61.71%
62.34%
41.16%

26.45%
50.85%
59.43%
57.18%
53.12%
62.23%
26.45%

Table II.A in the Appendix lists, for each year in the 2010–2015
period, average approval percentages in relation to the votes that were
actually cast in favor of the merger (as opposed to votes against or
abstain). Because in mergers voting against and not voting at all are
equivalent, when shareholders vote they almost always vote for the
merger: in the relevant period, the median of votes cast in favor (as
opposed to against or abstain) was 98.9%, whereas the mean was
97.02%.80
Fig. II shows the portion of mergers in the Majority Approval
Sample that were approved with 75% or more of the outstanding shares
for each year in the 2010–2015 period. Almost two out of three mergers
in the sample obtained votes equal to at least 75% of the outstanding
shares.81

80. That is because the votes required for approving a merger are keyed to a percentage of the
shares outstanding. Because voting involves certain costs, shareholders effectively vote against a
merger by not voting at all. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1250 (“[F]or matters requiring an
affirmative vote by a majority of the shares entitled to votesuch as mergers or charter
amendmentsa failure to vote is equivalent to a ‘no’ vote.”). A similar observation is contained in
Burch et al., supra note 21, at 51. Note that some authors have described “yes” votes measured as a
percentage of votes cast as the proxy that “best captures shareholder sentiment for a transaction.” See
Fisch et al., supra note 60, at 580 (noting that “it captures the sentiment of those shareholders who
choose to be present at the meeting and cast a ballot or abstain[,]” while “[s]hareholder failure to vote
at all can indicate a lack of support for a transaction, but it may also be caused by a variety of factors
that are independent of the merits.” Fisch et al., supra note 60, at 580). While I would agree that “yes”
votes as a percentage of votes cast can somewhat capture the sentiment of those who vote in favor of
the transaction, such a proxy cannot capture the sentiment of those who do not back the transaction,
precisely for that variety of factors the authors mention. We simply cannot know what is behind the
decision to not cast the vote, whether opposition to the transaction or simple disengagement. Note
that not voting to express dissent is not only feasible, but also perfectly rational, because it involves
less transaction costs. As a result, in this Article I rather use percentages of outstanding shares as
metric for shareholder support.
81. The only year in which results were somewhat balanced in this 75% classification was 2011,
whereby 54.3% of mergers were approved by at least 75% of the votes, while the remaining mergers
below such a threshold were 45.7%.
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Fig. II
Percentage of Mergers that Obtained 75% or More
of the Outstanding Shares
(Majority Approval Sample)

75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total
Sample

Fig. III shows the frequency distribution of voting outcomes for
mergers in the Majority Approval Sample. I organize the voting outcomes
in four classes with cut-offs at each incremental quarter in the (50%-)
continuum of possible approving percentages (that is, in the 50%-plusone-share-to-100% range): 62.5%, 75%, and 87.5%. The four classes
therefore are (i) mergers that obtained approval by less than 62.5% of the
outstanding shares, (ii) mergers that obtained a percentage of approval
between 62.5% and less than 75% of the outstanding shares, (iii) mergers
that obtained a percentage of approval between 75% and less than 87.5%
of the outstanding shares, and (iv) mergers that obtained approval by at
least 87.5% of the outstanding shares.
More than a half of the observed mergers (56.63% to be precise)
obtained approvals within the 75–87.49% range. Roughly three out of ten
mergers (31.63%) have been “safely” approved by a percentage between
62.5% and less than 75% of the outstanding shares. Interestingly,
mergers in the two remaining and opposite classes are equally
distributed: mergers obtaining 87.5% or more and mergers with less than
62.5% of the votes each represent 5.87% of the sample. Only 44 out of
392 mergers (11.22%) obtained less than 2/3 of the votes, which means
that almost 9 out of 10 mergers would have passed under a
2/3-supermajority requirement.82

82. The shape of distributions tends to be very similar over the years; recently, approvals in the
75%–87.49% range have increased.
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Fig. III
Frequency Distribution of Voting Outcomes
Majority Approval Sample
(% of Shares Outstanding)
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

less than 62.5%
62.5%-74.99%
75%-87.49%
more than 87.5%

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total

Fig. IV compares frequency distributions in the Majority Approval
Sample and 2/3 Approval Sample. The frequency distribution for the
Majority Approval Sample in the 2010–2015 period is on the left, while
the three83 columns to the right represent (i) mergers that were approved
by (more than 2/3 but) less than 75% of the outstanding shares, (ii)
mergers that obtained a percentage of approval between 75% and less
than 87.5% of the outstanding shares, and (iii) mergers that obtained a
percentage of approval of at least 87.5% of the outstanding shares.
The comparison reveals that the 2/3 Approval Sample contains
significantly less mergers below the 75% threshold than the Majority
Approval Sample (19% v. 37.5%). In other words, a higher majority
requirement likely prompts management to steer away from potentially
risky-to-approve mergers. The rather obvious corollary is that the
portion of mergers approved in the 75%–87.49% range is significantly
higher in the 2/3 Approval Sample (76.2% v. 56.6%).84

83. The 50%–62.49% column is missing because there were no mergers in the 2/3 Approval
Sample that failed to obtain less than 2/3 of the votes.
84. For a discussion, see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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Fig. IV
Frequency Distribution of Voting Outcomes Comparing the Majority
Approval Sample with the 2/3 Approval Sample
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Majority Approval Sample (less than 2/3 Approval Sample (less than 75% /
62.5% / 62.5-74.99% / 75-87.49% /
75-87.49% / 87.5-100% )
87.5-100%)

b. Approval Percentages Do Not Show Correlation with
Neither Sizes of Premium Nor Insider Ownership
Levels
What drives the high levels of approval percentages? The most
immediate answer is price: the higher the premium, the higher the
percentage of shares approving the merger.85 Another intuitive
explanation would mention the importance of the “starting point” of the
resolution. For example, if the company has high insider ownership
(directors, management, and/or significant shareholders), one would
expect a more substantial backing of the given transaction. In fact,
neither premiums nor insider ownership levels correlate with approval
percentages.
This analysis observes mergers from the Majority Approval Sample.
All data on premiums, type of consideration, size of insider ownership
and of voting agreements are hand-collected from the proxy statement or
S-4, as applicable, relating to the underlying merger. As Table III.A in the
Appendix explains, premiums do not have predictive power over the
percentage of shareholders voting for the merger. Fig. V shows the point
graphically: increasing approval percentages are not associated with
higher premiums calculated against the price of the stock on the day prior
85. Cf. Fisch et al., supra note 60, at 584 (finding that mergers involving a higher premium
generate a higher approval rate in terms of “yes” votes as a percentage of votes cast and as a percentage
of “yes” and “no” votes, but not finding significant results in terms of “yes” votes as a percentage of
outstanding shares, which is the main metric I adopt in this Article; supra note 80).
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to the announcement of the transaction (t-1 premium). Fig. VI shows
essentially the same results with premiums calculated on an unaffected
basis.86

86. As noted, all information on premiums is gathered from the securities filing relating to the
underlying merger. In such filings, issuers present information on the size of the premium offered to
shareholders, without being bound by specific requirements as to against which day(s) prior to the
announcement of the transaction the premium should be calculated (for example, one day, twenty
days, thirty days, sixty days prior to announcement). In practice, issuers (with their financial advisors)
generally calculate the premium against several benchmarks: in most circumstances (82% of the
mergers in the Majority Approval Sample), issuers report on the premium calculated against the price
of the stock on the day prior to the announcement of the transaction (what I call t-1 premium here).
But because the price of the stock on the day prior to announcement can be impacted by rumors on
the acquisition, companies generally also disclose additional premium calculations, which are aimed
at providing investors with premium figures that are not affected by merger rumors. Given that
companies are free to pick and choose any premium calculation they see fit (so long as it is true and
correct), there are no uniform metrics that apply across the board: some disclosure documents report
on premiums calculated against the price of the stock twenty days prior announcement, some others
use thirty and/or sixty day prior to figures, and so forth (and some issuers use averages for any such
window period). In calculating the unaffected premium, where available, I use the premium calculated
against the price of the stock thirty days prior to announcement. However, if that figure is not available
in a securities filing, I use the closest surrogate (whether it is twenty days or four weeks prior).
I generally try to stay as close as possible to the announcement date. Now, while I reckon that one can
object that for my comparisons I use unaffected premiums that are calculated with different criteria,
I counter that selecting a one-size-fits-all criterion (for instance a specific cut-off date across the board)
would not work: because in each merger the price of the stock can be impacted at different times and
sometimes well before the selected cut-off date, one cannot purport to consider as unaffected a
premium calculated in that manner. Rather, I use premium figures that are deemed unaffected by the
issuers and are presented/advertised as such to shareholders (if multiple premium figures are
presented I select the closest to the announcement day that appears unaffected). This way I compare
unaffected premiums, which shareholders themselves are asked to base their voting decision on. Since
all I am investigating here is whether premiums can predict shareholders’ decisions, I believe that
using information that shareholders understand is provided to them as unaffected premium absolves
the effort well.
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Fig. V
% of Shares in Favor v. T-1 Premium (Merger Approval Sample)
Correl. = -0.04
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Fig. VI
% of Shares in Favor v. Unaffected Premium (Merger Approval Sample)
Correl. = 0.013
140%

Premium (Unaffected)
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Tables IV.A–VIII.A in the Appendix show similar inconclusive
results after making a series of adjustments and additional tests.
First, in Table IV.A in the Appendix, I eliminate mergers with a
premium below 10% or above 60% from the sample. I also disregard a
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t-1 premium if the difference between the percentage of the unaffected
premium and the t-1 premium is 25% or higher. On the one hand, if a
premium is below 10%, it is most likely because rumors on the upcoming
merger have already been priced into the stock and therefore the variable
is noisy. Similarly, a t-1 premium that is so distant from the unaffected
premium has likely been eroded by merger rumors. On the other hand,
premiums above 60% are almost double the average premium and I
therefore treat them as outliers.87 Second, as voting results might be
impacted by insider ownership, since directors and managers are biased
to vote in favor, and/or the presence of voting agreements (whereby
shareholders are bound to vote in favor of the merger), in Table IV.A in
the Appendix, premiums are also tested against approval percentages net
of shares held by insiders or subject to voting agreements. In other
words, I test approval percentages with respect to disinterested
shareholders only. Even with these adjustments, premiums do not carry
predictive value as to the outstanding shares approving the merger.
In the same vein, in Table V.A in the Appendix, I test approval
percentages and premiums for mergers that are not subject to a voting
agreement and, within that group, mergers in which the insider
ownership at the target company is below 5%. Furthermore, in Table VI.A
in the Appendix, I compare average premium sizes for the whole sample
with averages premium sizes in circumstances in which insider
ownership or the shares subject to a voting agreement were pivotal in
reaching the required majority to approve the merger. In Table VI.A in
the Appendix, I also compare average premium sizes for the whole
sample with averages premium sizes of mergers that were supported by
a voting agreement and mergers that did not have such support. In all
such cases, I conclude that premiums do not significantly differ among
such various classes.
A couple of additional tests confirm this conclusion. A comparison
of medians and means of premiums for the thirty mergers that obtained
the least (bottom thirty mergers) and the most (top thirty mergers) votes
in favor do not show significant differences (Table VII.A in the
Appendix). Also, Table VII.A in the Appendix shows that average
premiums in the 2/3 Approval Sample, which is characterized by higher
approval percentages,88 are essentially similar to those in the Majority
Approval Sample (note however that the number of observations is
limited to twenty-nine for each of t-1 and unaffected premiums, so the
test itself might lack probative value). The takeaway is that, while a more
stringent approval requirement results in percentages that are actually
87. After such adjustments, Table IV.A in the Appendix also presents the data broken down by
type of consideration (cash, stock, or combination thereof) and still obtains similar inconclusive
results.
88. See supra Table II and Fig. IV.
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higher than those in the Majority Approval Sample, the premiums
associated with those deals are of similar magnitude and thus cannot be
considered the factor determining the higher approval. If premiums are
not the determining factor for higher approval percentages, something
else must be going on. A plausible scenario is that since deals with a
higher approval requirement are tougher to pass, the pondering by
management before submitting a deal is much more elaborated (hence
the overall lower number of deals in the 2/3 Approval Sample). However,
given the number of observations is limited (twenty-nine), additional
evidence is necessary to shed better light on this point. Note incidentally
that also the 2/3 Approval Sample shows lack of correlation between
premiums and voting outcomes.89
Table VIII.A in the Appendix provides cross-correlations between
key variables. Interestingly, even tests on whether approval percentages
correlate at all with the size of insider ownership (with or without a voting
agreement) show similar, negative results. Aside, of course, the
correlation between the two ways to calculate the premium (t-1 and
unaffected), the only correlation of some significance is between the
amount of inside ownership and the size of voting agreements, which
does not come as a surprise.
However, it would be a mistake to interpret these tests as indicating
that voting outcomes in mergers are not determined by merger
premiums. The lack of correlation between voting outcomes and
premiums should not be ascribed to shareholders’ indifference to merger
prices. As a preliminary note, such indifference would be at odds with the
fact that mergers experienced a passing rate of almost 99% in the
2006–2015 period, which likely would not have happened absent
premiums.90 In other words, while the size of premiums does not
correlate to the level of shares supporting the transactions, the presence
of premiums in virtually all the observed mergers (other than mergers of
equals) explains the 99% passing rate.
Moreover, other elements can explain the lack of correlation arising
from the tests. First, while shareholders might care in general about the
size of a premium, some of them might well be subject to collective action
considerations convincing them to not bother voting if, for instance, they
believe their vote will not matter, especially if they think the merger can
already count on a solid consensus.91 By the same token, because the
required majority is tied to a percentage of the share capital and does not

89. -0.02 with respect to t-1 premiums and -0.18 with respect to unaffected premiums.
90. The mean and median premiums for mergers in the 2010–2015 period, as captured by the
Majority Approval Sample, were respectively 31.1% and 28.6%, when calculated on a t-1 basis, and 41%
and 34%, when calculated on an unaffected basis. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
91. See Fisch et al., supra note 60, at 584 (considering non-votes noisy as a result of retail
investors’ lack of engagement); see also Fisch et al., supra note 60, at 580 n.121.
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depend on a fraction of shares present or represented at the relevant
resolution, directors might find out early that a sufficient number of
shares has backed the transaction and decide to discontinue, or at least
relax, the efforts of the campaign.92 This may explain why mergers with
high premiums do not necessarily attract higher votes.93
Second, the precise contours of voting outcomes might derive less
from the strict merits of the transaction itself than from the ownership
structure of the given company. Because many corporations award votes
on a one-share, one-vote basis, the number of actual voting rights
depends, one way or another, on stock ownership. Therefore, in many
cases the uniqueness of the ownership structure of a given company will
be the determining factor that drives the precise contours of a voting
outcome. The final vote count might depend on factors such as how much
institutional investors own vis-à-vis retail investors (the former tend to
regularly cast their ballots while some of the latter might not), whether
competitors of the acquiring corporation, or rival bidders, are
shareholders of the target, and so forth. All these and many more specific
features of the ownership structure of a company can lead to unique
92. In other words, management would not bother doing what it normally does when there is a
risk to lose the vote; cf. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 159, 162 (2008) (“With the polls about to close, management may apply intense campaigning
effort to sway votes and/or adjust poll closing times in order to gain victory.”).
93. As the chart below shows, there is very little difference in terms of percentage of shares voting
in favor between mergers that carried the highest premiums (from left to right, in dark gray line are
mergers with top twenty-seven premiums and associated percentages of shares in favor) with those
that carried the lowest ones (from left to right, in light gray line are mergers with worst twenty-nine
premiums and associated percentages).
Percentage of Shares in Favor
Mergers with Highest Premiums (top 27, dark gray line)
and Lowest Premiums (worst 29, light gray line)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
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40%
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20%
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outcomes that, to some extent, are disconnected from the underlying
quality of the very deal.
Third, in a vacuum, the given size of a premium does not per se have
absolute significance, for identical premiums might send a different
signal to the market and have a different appeal to shareholders,
depending on the type of company and its recent history. For instance, a
25% premium for a company in an expanding industry, or for a company
whose stock is systematically undervalued, is not the same as a 25%
premium for a company in a stagnant industry, or for a company whose
stock is the darling of market analysts. The former premiums might be
considered insufficient for the underlying potential of the target and
gather a lukewarm response. Accounting for this and the other elements
mentioned above is beyond the scope of this Article, but future research
should investigate these and other possible explanations.
4. Time Necessary for a Shareholder Vote
Mergers affecting an SEC-registered issuer are corporate
transactions that take a long time to close. One of the reasons for the
significant lag is the necessity to hold a shareholder vote. A vote requires
a whole host of activities, even for a simple transaction like a cash merger:
preparing the preliminary proxy statement, selecting a proxy solicitor,
filing the preliminary proxy statement with the SEC, taking into account
the SEC’s comments if the Commission intends to review the proxy
statement,94 fixing the record and meeting dates by the board of
directors,95 finalizing and printing the definitive proxy statement, filing
the proxy statement with the SEC, mailing copies of it to shareholders,96
preparing for the meeting, (scripts, agenda, rules of conduct, ballots, and
so forth) and actually holding the meeting. The bulk of provisions that
generate substantial delay to hold a meeting, namely the time to prepare,
finalize, print, and mail the proxy statement (or other disclosure
document, in a non-cash merger), come from federal securities
regulation, not state corporate laws.97

94. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2017) (regulating the form, content, and filing requirements for
proxy statements). Any person soliciting must file preliminary copies of proxy statements with the SEC
at least ten days before they are sent to shareholders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2017).
95. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2016) (allows only the board of person authorized in the
articles or bylaws to call a special meeting); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (2016) (noting the board of
directors sets the record date, which cannot be more than 60 days nor less than ten days before the
date of the meeting).
96. Definitive copies of proxy materials must be filed with the SEC no later than the date they are
first sent to shareholders. Additionally, copies of these materials also must be filed with each national
securities exchange on which the registrant has a class of securities listed and registered. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6.
97. Generally, shareholder voting is “overwhelmingly a matter of federal law.” See Mark J. Roe,
Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 612 (2003).

GATTI-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

April 2018]

RECONSIDERING THE MERGER PROCESS

4/6/2018 4:01 PM

869

Part III.A.4. describes how long it normally takes to close deals and,
in particular, to hold a shareholder vote. From the 2006–2015 Sample, I
focus on mergers approved in 2014 and 2015. For each transaction, I
calculate the time lags (i) between signing date and meeting date, and (ii)
between meeting date and closing date.98 Given that cash mergers have a
leaner regime than mergers entailing a stock consideration (that is
because of the securities law implications of offering securities in
exchange),99 the data I present also distinguishes between the two types
of deals.100
As a starting point to appreciate timing in merger transactions,
Table IX.A in the Appendix reveals that it takes quite a while to close
mergers, that cash-only deals take much less time, and that there is
generally a lot of variance in the observed lags. The average deal takes
four to five months to close, with cash deals being generally quicker
(slightly less than four months on average) than mergers with some stock
consideration (five to six months on average).
It is hard to say with precision how much the shareholder vote alone
contributes to prolonging the time to close. Voting clearly creates delay,
as Table IV demonstrates. A shareholder vote occurs on average roughly
four months after the signing day, with cash mergers being much quicker.
However, the completion of a deal can be delayed by several factors other
than the vote itself. Such factors can range from structural complexities101
to antitrust102 or other regulatory103 issues.104 Still, even assuming, when
98. While information on the meeting date is originally reported in the FSSR Dataset, I have
gathered signing and closing dates from public filings.
99. The securities issued in exchange are a public offering for securities law purposes and require
a prospectus compliance with the panoply of rules under the Securities Act of 1933; cf. John C. Coates
IV, The Powerful and Pervasive Effects of Ownership on M&A 13 (Harvard Law Sch. Discussion Paper
No. 669, 2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1884157 (mentioning the following provisions: “1933 Act
§ 5 (requiring registration statement to be filed with SEC prior to offers of stock to public); 1934 Act
§ 14 (framework for proxy and tender offer rules); SEC Rules 145 (stock mergers treated as stock offers
under 1933 Act), 14a-3 and 14a-6 (proxy statements must be filed with SEC and furnished to
shareholders prior to soliciting proxies or consents, including efforts to persuade shareholders to
withhold proxies or consents from others.) Id.
100. This is consistent with previous studies that have calculated average duration of M&A deals
and have distinguished between cash deals and deals involving securities. See John C. Coates & Guhan
Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 391
(2000) (distinguishing cash deals from stock deals while analyzing the agency costs associated with
lockups).
101. That would be the case if, for instance, other transactions, such as a refinancing, a spin-off, or
other types reorganizations, need to happen.
102. For instance, the merging entities have one or more businesses that if combined can lead to
anticompetitive conduct.
103. That is the case if the target and/or the acquirer are regulated entities, such as banks, broker
dealers, utilities, and so forth.
104. See generally Coates & Subramanian, supra note 100, at 379–80:
[S]everal sources of variation in deal delay exist: (1) SEC registration procedures if stock
consideration is used, as is common for public bidders in rising stock markets, and at all
times in industries, such as banking, where bidder equity capital is scarce or intentionally
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any such complexities are present, that voting does not result in more
time to close a given merger, it will still add an extra layer of procedural
headache, which likely increases opportunity costs and loss of time for
the corporate planners.105
With these disclaimers in mind, the data on timing for shareholders
to approve a merger reveals a long process. Even deals that are voted in
a relatively quick fashion take time: looking at the whole sample, at the
25th percentile a deal took 86 days to be approved (the 25th percentile is
73 days for cash deals and 107 days for deals with a stock component).
Medians, means and 75th percentile figures confirm the time consuming
nature of shareholder approval: in respect of the whole sample those are
108, 120, and 136 days, respectively. For cash deals, such figures are
slightly lower 88, 95, and 108 days, respectively, while for deals with a
stock component they are much higher: 131, 143, and 163 days,
respectively.
Table IV
Time between Signing and Meeting Dates
Year

No. Of
Observed
Mergers

Time Between Signing And Meeting Dates
Median

Mean

67

109

86

106

119
(55)
120
(52)
120
(53)

All Deals
2014
2015
Entire Period

153

108

All-Cash Mergers
2014

33

86

2015

41

90

Entire Period

74

88

Mergers With
Stock
Consideration
2014

34

136

2015

45

125

Entire Period

79

131

92
(33)
97
(41)
95
(37)

145
(59)
142
(52)
143
(55)

25th Percentile

75th Percentile

81

143

86

131

86

136

67

115

78

104

73

108

102

161

108

163

107

163

kept near a regulatory minimum; (2) special regulatory approvals, such as those required
in the banking, utilities, or telecommunications industries; and (3) antitrust review, if the
deal raises antitrust concerns or will require divestitures to be completed (as is increasingly
common).
Coates & Subramanian, supra note 100, at 379–80. Of course, to speed up this lengthy process,
sophisticated corporate planners run different closing activities on separate tracks with the help of
various lawyers (corporate, securities, antitrust, and any industry-specific expert depending on the
type of deal, such as banking, energy, aviation, telecommunications and so forth).
105. In other words, even though the voting requirement itself might not always be the sole reason
for a delayed closing day, it would extract additional efforts and attention from the people involved.
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As noted, a shareholder vote is not the only reason that mergers take
time. But it is not easy (nor probably even feasible) to actually determine
with some precision the (extra) time such a requirement normally adds
to a merger timetable. A reasonably reliable proxy would be to identify
deals that do not present particular structural, antitrust or regulatory
complexities, whereby shareholder approval is the only obstacle to a
rapid closing. To do that accurately, one would need to perform an
in-depth qualitative analysis of each deal, possibly combined with
interviews of corporate planners and their advisors. While this type of
research is probably difficult to compile (if only because of the
confidentiality duties legal advisors are subject to), it is certainly beyond
the scope of my current work. Instead, I gather the lack of complexity of
a given deal by implication. If a merger closes relatively shortly after a
shareholder meeting, I assume the shareholder approval requirement
was the actual piece of the transaction determining a delay in closing the
transaction. In this spirit, Table V calculates the average time for a
shareholder vote for only the subset of deals that closed within ten days
after the shareholder meeting.
The data for these somewhat less complex mergers, in which the
shareholder vote requirement is the main factor determining a lengthy
transaction, show findings similar to what we have seen for all mergers:
(i) Even relatively faster deals take some time: the 25th percentile is
78 days for cash deals and 94 days for deals with a stock component; and
(ii) Median, mean and 75th percentile figures are 91, 93, and 105
days respectively, while for deals with a stock component they are much
higher (106, 120, and 134 days, respectively).
Note again that these mergers represent a nontrivial segment of the
entire universe of transactions: 41.2% of total deals, 39.2% of all cash
mergers, and 43% of mergers with a stock component.106

106. As the medians and means are closer in Table V than in Table IV, it is plausible that the longer
timetables of mergers in Table IV are driven by other factors, including the presence of a few outliers
that cause delays before and after the meeting (such outlier being eliminated in Table V through the
10-day closing cut-off).
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Table V
Time between Signing and Meeting Dates
(Mergers that Closed within 10 Days After Shareholder Vote)
Year

No. Of
Observed
Mergers

No. Of Mergers Closed
Within 10 Days Of Shs
Meeting (Percentage
Of Total Mergers)

Median

Time Between Signing And Meeting Dates

All Deals
2014

67

27 (40.3%)

100

2015

87

36 (41.4%)

103

Entire Period

153

63 (41.2%)

101

All-Cash Mergers
2014

33

15 (44.1%)

92

2015

41

15 (36.6%)

91

Entire Period

74

29 (39.2%)

91

Mergers With
Stock
Consideration
2014

34

12 (35.3%)

99

2015

45

21 (46.7%)

113

Entire Period

79

34 (43%)

106

Mean
(Standard
Deviation)
104
(30)
112
(44)
108
(38)
95
(33)
92
(14)
93
(25)

108
(25)
127
(51)
120
(44)

25th
Percentile

75th
Percentile

85

124

87.5

119

84

123

68

109

80

103.5

78

105

89

131

101

134

94

134

B. ASSESSING SHAREHOLDER ACTION IN MERGERS
This Part analyzes the data presented thus far. Part II.B.1 surveys
plausible reasons for the extremely low number of rejections of mergers
by shareholders, the few instances of narrow-margin deals, and the
overwhelmingly high approval percentages. Part II.B.2 highlights the
potential drawbacks of voting, especially in light of the substantial delay
it imposes on the completion of a merger transaction.
1. Explaining the Extremely Few Rejected and Narrow-Margin
Deals, as Well as the High Approval Percentages
This Subpart seeks to shed light on the approval and rejection data
illustrated earlier by addressing the following explanations: (a) presence
of premiums, (b) credible threat of shareholder rejection, (c) absence of
a real choice for shareholders, and (d) inflation of approval rates because
of arbitrage and/or shareholder conflicts.
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a. Mergers Are No-Brainers Because Shareholders
Like Premiums
Shareholders do like merger activity because deals bring
premiums.107 Per the Majority Approval Sample, in the 2010–2015
period premiums averaged approximately 28.6% (median) and 31.1%
(mean), when calculated on a t-1 basis, and 34% (median) or 41% (mean),
when calculated on an unaffected basis. The fact that the “approve” votes
overwhelmingly dominate the “reject” ones should therefore not be
surprising. The presence of a premium might well explain why mergers
get more shareholder support than other instances of shareholder
engagement in connection of corporate governance-related
resolutions.108
107. See, e.g., Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their
Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 16–18 (1988);
see also B. Espen Eckbo, Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency 28 (ECGI Finance Working
Paper No. 391, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2340754; see also Audra
Boone et al., Shareholder Decision Rights in Acquisitions: Evidence from Tender Offers 5–9 (Indiana
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 331, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629424 (acknowledging
that the size of the premium is a significant factor motivating shareholder approval while discussing
the effect of lower approval thresholds and the power of shareholders to holdout for higher premiums
in these situations); David Becher et al., Do Shareholders Listen? M&A Advisor Opinions and
Shareholder Voting 7–10 (Univ. of Md. Dep’t of Fin. Research Paper, 2010),
https://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/files/Documents/Departments/Finance/Session6BecherDoSharehol
dersListen.pdf (discussing the incentive for advisors to give a lower value to target companies such
that the offered premium seems higher and thereby more likely to garner shareholder approval); see
also Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices
as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 894 (1988) (“Target shareholders earn large returns
in the form of premia.”); see also Coates, supra note 37, at 33 (“M&A transactions generally generate
significant gains to target shareholders who sell.”).
108. For instance, the following were the average voting results in 2014 in connection with
corporate governance-related shareholder proposals, sorted by selected topics (the sample excludes
topics such as executive compensation and social responsibility):
(i) allow for (or ease requirement to) act by written consent—twenty-seven proposals, average votes in
favor: 38.1% (as percentage of votes cast) and 27% (as percentage of shares outstanding);
(ii) allow for (or ease requirement to) call special meetings—fourteen proposals, average votes in favor:
45% (as percentage of votes cast) and 31.5% (as percentage of shares outstanding);
(iii) change from plurality to majority voting—twenty-seven proposals, average votes in favor: 56.5%
(as percentage of votes cast) and 43.6% (as percentage of shares outstanding);
(iv) declassify board—fifteen proposals, average votes in favor: 80.6% (as percentage of votes cast) and
63.7% (as percentage of shares outstanding);
(v) eliminate dual class structure—nine proposals, average votes in favor: 23.3% (as percentage of
votes cast) and 19.4% (as percentage of shares outstanding);
(vi) eliminate supermajority vote requirements—twelve proposals, average votes in favor: 66.2% (as
percentage of votes cast) and 50.6% (as percentage of shares outstanding);
(vii) allow proxy access—thirteen proposals, average votes in favor: 39.1% (as percentage of votes cast)
and 32% (as percentage of shares outstanding);
(viii) separate CEO/chairman positions—sixty-two proposals, average votes in favor: 31% (as
percentage of votes cast) and 24.5% (as percentage of shares outstanding);
cf. THE CONFERENCE BD., PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS (2010–2014) 61 (2014). Note that the majority
generally required to pass any of the above resolutions (majority of the vote cast) is different than
the one generally necessary to approve mergers (majority of the shares outstanding).
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To be clear, it is likely that deals have premiums of a certain size
because of the shareholder approval requirementand I am referring to
shareholder approval in a loose meaning here to cover both a vote (like
in a merger), or a tender decision (like in a tender offer), for sizeable
premiums are of course present also in tender offers, in which a
shareholder resolution is not necessary. But mergers (as well as friendly
tender offers) must first be approved by the board of directors of the
target and therefore the size of premiums in the current legal
environment is a combination of both (i) the negotiating powers of the
board (which anticipates, and is influenced by, a subsequent shareholder
decision), and (ii) the shareholder decision itself.109
Certainly, the mere presence of a premium does not automatically
mean shareholders will approve the deal: size matters.110 If, for instance,
the consideration is cash, shareholders know that approving the merger
will result in an endgame situation. If the merger passes, they will never
have the opportunity to sell at a better premium because they will no
longer hold any equity stake in the target post-closing. And that is why a
small premium might not do it because a merger is the time, and
probably the only time, to cash in a large premiumshareholders’
expectations are geared toward that goal and (have to) rely on
management to negotiate vigorously on their behalf.111
b. Self-Selection Bias in the Sample: Directors Seek
Shareholder Approval Only with “Good” Deals
The pressures of agency costs affect the negotiating skills and efforts
by directors. Deals are negotiated by a management team that in some
cases anticipates, and in other wishes, to continue working with the new
ownership post-closing. Corporate executives can then be tempted to
trade off merger premiums with private benefits in the form of side
payments or various career opportunities.112

109. See infra Part II.B.2.
110. I reckon that, as noted supra Part III.A.3.b, premiums and voting outcomes in the Majority
Approval Sample do not correlate. However, for the reasons stated in such Part, this does not mean
shareholders are insensitive to premiums.
111. Enhanced fiduciary duties are often attached to situations in which shareholders of a target
company face losing the prospect of selling their stock at a substantial premium, because soon the
company would no longer be contestable and shareholders would experience a permanent “loss of
voting rights” without being compensated with a premium. See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43 (1993), which stated that the Paramount directors were obligated to seek the
best value reasonably available for stockholders to compensate for the imminent loss of voting power
following the change in control of Paramount (“[W]hen a majority of a corporation’s voting shares are
acquired by a single person or entity . . . , there is a significant diminution in the voting power of those
who thereby become minority stockholders.”).
112. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See Coates, supra note 37, at 11 (noting that
“[f]iduciaries may seek to sell their company ‘too early’ or ‘too cheaply’ to trigger ‘golden parachutes’
or vesting under option plans or retirement plans, or in return for benefits from the buyer.”). Compare
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But if potential conflicts suggest that in some instances management
might not operate as an effective negotiator, the law gives shareholders
the power to turn down a deal if they believe a small premium would not
adequately reward their exit.113 Directors perceive that poor deals run the
risk of defeat, and such perception represents a “credible threat” that
induces them to be more discriminating in the mergers they propose.114
Directors do care about market scrutiny when a merger vote is pending,
as they anticipate the risk that if they propose an unappealing deal, they
might be turned down by shareholderssomething that can have a big
reputational impact not just on the company’s business and operations,
but also on their professional profiles.115 Additionally, board members
Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from “Mergers of Equals”,
20 J.L. ECON. ORG. 60, 89–96 (2004) (documenting such trade-offs in mergers of equals), with Eckbo,
supra note 107, at 14 (“The literature on deal initiation . . . establishes that takeover premiums are
lower in seller-initiated than in bidder-initiated deals, and that deal initiation affects target CEO
compensation.”).
Compare how this trade-off presented itself in connection with the recently disputed merger between
Signet and Zale (In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 585363, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 1, 2015)):
On January 16, 2014, [acquirer’s CEO] Barnes informed [target’s CEO] Killion that [the
acquirer] Signet planned, post-merger, to keep [target] Zale as a separate division within
Signet, and it wanted Killion to continue to lead that division from its headquarters in Texas.
Killion also allegedly stood to earn nearly twice as much as the head of a division within
Signet as he was earning as Zale’s CEO.
113. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 937–38 (8th ed. 2013):
Management acts as a gatekeeper in that no proposal for a . . . merger can be presented by
shareholders unless the board of directors first approves it. Assuming loyal management,
rational shareholders would choose for management to play this gatekeeper role;
shareholders themselves would not be interested in considering any transaction that their
experts had not already concluded was in the shareholders’ interests. The further
requirement that target shareholders also approve a transaction limits the potential that
management may be disloyal in approving a proposed acquisition recommending it despite
too low a price only because of post-transaction benefits promised by the acquiring
company.
114. I borrow this expression and the underlying logic from Burch et al., supra note 21, at 52
(analyzing merger voting patterns at acquirers and arguing that merger votes do provide credible
threats for management). They stated, “management might sometimes overestimate the level of
shareholder support a proposed deal will gain . . . . If there is a realistic risk that merger votes can fail,
then despite high approval rates on average we should observe votes that pass by relatively narrow
margins.” Burch et al., supra note 21, at 46.
115. Analyzing the parallel issue of shareholder voting in mergers at the acquiring firm, see Burch
et al., supra note 21, at 46 (“[a] failed vote would presumably damage management’s reputation,
providing ammunition for any shareholders interested I replacing the management team.”); Kai Li et
al., Shareholder Approval in Mergers & Acquisitions 9 (European Corporate Governance Inst., 2016),
http://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/Shareholder%20Approval%20in%20Mergers%20and%2
0Acquisitions.pdf (“[T]he threat of a failed vote is real and costly because a defeated merger proposal
may flag shareholders’ lack of confidence in management and could potentially result in management
turnover.”). For the argument that “[t]he vote on the merger can be viewed as a mid-term election of
directors, a vote of confidence on a major decision,” see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 416.
For the argument that “managers have, on average, incentives to include proposals only if they believe
they will pass[,]” see Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and
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know they are subject to potentially invasive judicial review for breaches
of a whole host of enhanced fiduciary duties, and to the risk of having
their business paralyzed in the interim period before closing.
Overall, the combined constraints, represented by the credible
threat of rejection because of shareholder veto power and by the risk of
litigation, create a screening mechanism whereby directors are induced
to propose only deals that shareholders would not be expected to vote
down and the judiciary would be reluctant to second-guess (especially
today, in the aftermath of Corwin).116 As a result, the high approval rates
observed in Part II.A.3 and the few instances of barely approved mergers
might well reflect a self-selection bias in the sample. Because most
managers prefer to gain shareholder support, they propose deals they
believe will be approved: Most of the time they are right, but in some few
instances they overestimate the level of shareholder support and the vote
is at risk of failinghence the presence of a few deals that pass by narrow
margins.117 The data analyzed here support this hypothesis. Mergers
subject to a more stringent approval requirement (2/3 v. 50%) register a
higher portion of mergers approved in the 75%–87.49% range (76.2% in
the 2/3 Approval Sample v. 56.6% in the Majority Approval Sample).
This suggests that when a supermajority is required, directors may feel
that deal approval is at risk and entertain more efforts to get the approval
(and are possibly even more selective when submitting deals in the first
place), which in turn results in higher percentages of votes in favor.118
Also, a comparison with the much higher non-completion rates present
in other studies (around 22% v. 1% circa)119 confirms the point. Because
the samples in those studies are based on all announced deals, while the
one used here is based on deals for which directors actually did call a
meeting, it is plausible that some deals present in those studies were so
unappealing that directors resolved to not even bother calling a meeting
and thus are not recognized in the sample.120
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 FIN. MGMT. 29, 36 (2002).
116. See supra Part I.C.
117. For this line of reasoning, but in the context of acquirer firm shareholder vote, see Burch
et al., supra note 21, at 46.
118. Interestingly though, as noted supra note 89 and accompanying text, while deals in the 2/3
Approval Sample are associated with higher approval percentages, they carry premiums that are
essentially similar to those in the Majority Approval Sample. See also Table VII.A in the Appendix.
119. See supra note 67.
120. However, this cannot be the sole explanation. In fact, as explained supra in note 67, the
samples are intrinsically different. Not only do I take into account only deals with Russell 3000
companies, but I also screen out noncontestable targets: from an original dataset of 1067 deals in the
FSSR Sample, after reviewing all pertinent securities filings, I eliminated 160 deals to obtain the 907
deals in the 2006–2015 Sample. Furthermore, some deals that were not completed in the other studies
might have plausibly been abandoned for reasons other than fear of lacking shareholder support: For
instance, a rival bid arises, the buyer calls a MAC and the parties agree to terminate the deal, see infra
Part II.B.2.b, regulatory approval becomes realistically unattainable, financing does not materialize,
and so forth.
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What future research should seek to establish is whether
shareholders anticipate receiving proposals for good deals only, and thus
cast votes and approve mergers without too much pondering.
c. Do Shareholders Really Have a Choice?
Shareholder voting can reflect no real choice after all. First, even
when the merger consideration on the table is not irresistible,
shareholders might still decide to approve the transaction, because they
see no better alternative in the near future. Consider that, at the time of
the vote, the target company has been in play for a decent amount of time,
at the very least a good couple of months, but generally much more.121
After a few months without improvements to the original deal,
shareholders might have low expectations on the future value of the
target and, rather than waiting for a better deal in an uncertain future,
decide to take the merger consideration while still available. A deal today
can be better than no deal at all.122
Second, the inherent pro-management advantages of proxy rules
and machinery123 might help companies accumulate more votes because
of how easier their proxy campaign issome authors even label the
whole voting system as “rigged.”124
121. See Coates, supra note 37, at 32 (“[A]cquisitions of US public targets (most of which are
mergers that involve at least some non-cash consideration, and so require registration of securities
with the SEC) typically take 60 to 90 days from announcement to complete . . .”). Others generally
describe longer timeframes: see, e.g., David J. Denis & Antonio J. Macias, Material Adverse Change
Clauses and Acquisition Dynamics, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (noting an average
of four and a half months from announcement to closing in their sample). For an analysis of the
average time to get to a shareholder vote with respect to mergers approved (or supposed to be
approved) in the 2014–2015 period, see Table IX.A in the Appendix and supra Table IV and Table V
and related discussion.
122. In other words, something akin to substantive coercion in tender offers could be at play:
Maybe shareholders could get more, but they rarely do because they do not know when the
opportunity will arise again and thus prefer to take what is on the table.
123. See Listokin, supra note 69, at 631 (noting that “narrow dissident victories raise market value,
while narrow management wins reduce value” and explaining it with “management’s advantages[,
which] are able to ‘move’ the opinion of the median shareholder in favor of management.”); see also
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688–93 (2007) (citing
discretion over the timing of a vote, contact information for shareholders, proxy expenses
reimbursement, and conflicts by institutional shareholder who fear losing their business with a
corporate client).
124. See Laurent Bach & Daniel Metzger, Are Shareholder Votes Rigged? 15 (Swedish House of
Fin. Research Paper No. 17-3, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2880523 (presenting evidence estimating that 11% of closely contested proposals that were
presented by insurgents and that were eventually rejected by shareholders would have passed if
management had not been able to systematically affect the voting results); see also Listokin, supra
note 92, at 160; Listokin, supra note 69, at 620 (“[M]anipulation of the vote share [held by
management] is a possibility, as there are more close management victories than close dissident
victories.”); see also Richard W. Barrett, Elephant in the Boardroom?: Counting the Vote in Corporate
Elections, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 125, 128 (2009) (noting “the curious absence of accountability for
accurately counting votes in corporate elections.”).
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d. Approval Percentages Are Inflated
We cannot know for sure whether all shareholders who vote in favor
of a merger do so because they believe the merger consideration reflects
the inherent value of the corporation and is superior to holding on to
their shares. Merger arbitrage and shareholder conflicts are two
mechanisms that can alter the sincerity of the voting process and inflate
the votes in favor of the merger.
i.

Merger Arbitrage

In general, shareholders’ interests are not necessarily homogeneous.
Among other factors, particular strategies and investment horizon might
shape their goals differently. As noted, in the context of M&A
transactions the heterogeneity of shareholders’ interests is intensified by
their opportunity to cash in a premium, irrespective of whether such a
premium is a satisfying one.125 This is because M&A transactions ignite
opportunities to make short-term gains by taking the deal consideration,
which in turn attracts merger arbitrageurs. After a deal is announced,
such investors quickly proceed to buy stakes in the target company and
become a significant player in a company’s ownership. Most of the time,
their strategy is to bet on the eventual closing of the deal so they can
pocket the merger consideration: That way, they would profit from the
difference between such consideration and the price they paid when they
bought shares on the market right after the transaction was announced.
That price difference is primarily based on their eagerness to assume the
risk of deal completion.126 If the deal closes, they gain. Otherwise, they
lose their bet. Therefore, the only voting strategy that makes sense for
these shareholders is approving the transaction.127
Merger arbitrageurs constitute significant chunks of the shareholder
base once a transaction is announced, although the precise contours are
not clear. Future research should shed light on their actual relevance in

125. See Gatti, supra note 27, at 235–36.
126. Assuming a deal that the market is keen on, absent expectations of rival bids, right after
announcement, the stock will trade very close to (but slightly below) the deal price (the spread to deal
price reflects the risk that the deal will for some reason not close). Those shareholders who do not want
to lose the opportunity to cash in will sell at merger arbitrageurs at slightly below the merger price,
with the price spread being a sort of premium that selling investors are eager to pay to the arb for
assuming the completion risk (the extent of such a spread is predicated to depend on several factors,
including the probability of closing, hostile or friendly transaction, merger or tender offer, strategic or
financial buyer, timing to close the deal, expectation on the trading price if the deal does not go
through, probability of higher bids, dividends in the interim period, and so forth). See generally
THOMAS KIRCHNER, MERGER ARBITRAGE: HOW TO PROFIT FROM GLOBAL EVENT-DRIVEN ARBITRAGE
18–27 (2d ed. 2016) (describing basic mechanics of merger arbitrage).
127. As the Delaware Chancery Court put it in Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. 16 A.3d 48,
111 (Del. Ch. 2011), short-term arbitrageurs are “happy to tender their shares at [the offer] price
regardless of the potential long-term value of the company.”
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the shareholder base of targets after deals are announced.128 But
certainly, several of the votes cast in connection with mergers come from
a type of investor who almost always is biased to approve the transaction
irrespective of its underlying merits.129 This is a supplemental
explanation for the high merger approval percentages.130
ii. Conflict of Interests
Both completion and percentage rates might be influenced by
insider ownership supporting the transaction.131 Barring extraordinary
circumstances, directors and managers always vote to support the
merger. They often do so because they have signed voting agreements
with the acquiring firm to that effect.132 On some occasions, the insiders’
votes sway the ultimate outcome of the transaction. In the Majority
Approval Sample, six of the 13 narrow-margin deals that were approved
128. In the Airgas transaction, following the announcement of the takeover by Air Products,
arbitrageurs and other event-driven investors started to purchase significant stakes in the target stock
that ultimately allowed them to own approximately 46% of the company. Id. at 118; see also Mark J.
Roe, Corporate Short-TermismIn the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 990
(2013) (detailing then-Chancellor Chandler’s analysis regarding the role of short-termism and deal
arbitrageurs in Airgas).
129. One may object that if the deal were not good, then a merger arb would short the stock and
vote against the merger. Of course that is a possibility. But it would be a pretty risky one because of
the overall sentiment on mergers and the expectation that almost all of them, for one reason or the
other, get approved; cf. Offenberg & Pirinsky, supra note 37, at 336 (reporting that only 15% of the
deals in their sample experienced a negative spread). But see Wei Jiang et al., Influencing Control:
Jawboning in Risk Arbitrage 3–5 (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 15-41, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2587925 (distinguishing between “activist
arbitrageurs [who] stand ready to assume a higher deal failure risk [and] passive arbitrageurs who
simply vote their shares in favor of the deal” and noting that activist arbitrage activities were spotted
in 13% and 6.5% of the deals in 2013 and 2014, respectively).
130. On the flip side, shareholders who strongly oppose the deal might be better off selling (and/or
short-selling) the stock rather than relying on their voice. This strategy is likely more pronounced in
stock-for-stock deals, in which shareholders do not have an opportunity to cash in at the merger price,
nor are generally provided with appraisal rights: see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2016) (where shares
of a company are publicly traded and the merger consideration is stock of the other merging
corporation, there are no appraisal rights). Early exit strategies available on the stock market might
explain why the pool of opponents ends up being less populated even for nonenticing deals. For a
similar argument made in the context of acquiring-firm merger votes, see Burch et al., supra note 21,
at 51–52:
Even if many investors share negative views, they may prefer to sell rather than face
uncertainty over whether shareholders (as a class) will vote to defeat the merger. Because
selling investors do not voteindeed they are replaced with buying investors who likely
have more positive viewsdeals with negative announcement reactions can nonetheless
pass with high approval rates.
131. For a similar observation in the broader context of voting outcomes on management
proposals of various type (i.e., not just mergers), Cf. Bethel & Gillan, supra note 115, at 36
(“Managers . . . appear to have been likely to include proposals when they had sufficient holdings to
influence voting results . . .”).
132. Voting agreements are present in 43.4% of the deals in the Majority Approval Sample. On
average, such agreements aggregate approximately 14% of the outstanding shares (precisely, the
median is 13.67%, the mean is 14.74%, and the standard deviation is 10.37%).
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by a vote of less than 60% of the outstanding shares, ultimately passed
because of votes cast by insiders.133 Delaware judges do not seem
particularly keen to second-guess shareholder votes. Recently, in the
context of the Zale merger litigation, the Chancery Court discussed, yet
dismissed, whether a shareholder, who stood to earn an additional $3.2
million in prepayment fees on a loan they had previously made to the
target Zale, was conflicted in casting its 23.3% stake in favor of the
merger (such stake was worth approximately $225 million at the price of
the merger consideration).134
133. The table below contains all narrow margin deals (that is, deals approved with a percentage
of less than 60% of the outstanding shares) in the 2010–2015 period, with details on approving
percentages, insider ownership levels, whether there was a voting agreement, and whether the vote by
insiders was pivotal for approving the merger. Note that, for the reasons stated infra note 135 and
accompanying text, the mere fact that the vote by insiders was pivotal, which happened in roughly half
of the deals in the table below, is not per se sufficient to establish that the resolution was tainted by a
conflict of interest.
Target Company
Name

Meeting
Date

% of Shares
Outstanding

Insider
Ownership
(*)

Voting
Agreement?
(%)

Insider Vote
Pivotal?

infoGROUP

6/29/10

57.23%

~34%

Yes (~34%)

Yes

Virtual Radiologic

7/12/10

56.99%

~36%

Yes (~33%)

Yes

Occam Networks

1/27/11

59.47%

~30%

Yes (~27%)

Yes

Conexant Systems

4/18/11

50.85%

~1.41%

No

Yes

Marshall & Ilsley

5/17/11

58.00%

~1.54%

No

No

drugstore.com

6/2/11

52.18%

< 2%

No

Almost (**)

Zoran

8/30/11

57.00%

~14%

Yes (1%)

Yes

Cogdell Spencer

3/9/12

59.43%

~6.6%

No

No

Medicis
Pharmaceutical

12/7/12

59.52%

~3.8%

No

No

EnergySolutions

4/26/13

58.14%

~4.1%

No

No

H.J. Heinz

4/30/13

59.81%

~1.4%

No

No

Plains Exploration &
Production

5/20/13

57.18%

~31.3%

Yes (~31.3%)

Yes

5/29/14

53.12%

~24.7%

Yes (~23.2)

Yes

Zale

(*) Includes ownership by directors, management, and significant shareholders.
(**) The resolution approving the merger would still have passed without the insider vote, but with an
extremely tight margin.
134. The alleged conflict was based on the fact that the merger triggered the $3.2 million payment,
which the Court ultimately did not consider material because it only amounted to less than 1.5% of the
payment the shareholder was expecting from its consideration under the merger. In re Zale Corp.
Stockholders Litig., No. CV 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct.
1, 2015), amended on reargument, No. CV 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 655148 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2015)
(noting that under Delaware law “there are cases in which a plaintiff’s allegations of a large
stockholder’s need for liquidity have been sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”).
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It is beyond the scope of my current work to determine whether or
not those insiders’ votes were cast in the best interests of the corporation:
to do that, one needs to establish whether rejecting the deal was a better
course of action than approving it, by looking at what the expected value
of the target as an independent entity was at the time of the vote.135
Interestingly, one can argue that, if the purpose for having the
shareholder approval requirement in the first place is to curb the
intensified agency problems directors and managers might have in a final
period,136 then letting those same agents vote and be in a position to
influence the fate of the deal contradicts such a purpose.
2. Delay as the Main Drawback of Shareholder Voting
Out-of-pocket transaction costs and delay in connection with the
closing of the merger procedure are the often cited drawbacks of
shareholder voting in mergers.137 While I do not believe the cost of
meetings should be a major concern, the long timeframes imposed by a
shareholder vote should be considered.
Organizing a special meeting of stockholders is no doubt expensive,
mainly in terms of paying proxy solicitor, accountants, and lawyers, as
well as printing and mailing the disclosure materials.138 While proxy
solicitor expenses are normally in the $75,000–$200,000 range,
generally depending on deal size,139 and costs of accountants are around
$1.5 million,140 it is harder to quantify the exact extent of lawyers’ fees

135. As I stated elsewhere, the complex aspect in policing shareholders’ conflicts of interest in the
M&A context is that their negative influence is circumstantial: the mere possibility of a conflict is not
sufficient to taint the vote. “The pathology . . . is pursuing a personal interest and casting a pivotal vote
against the interests of the other shareholders: to make such determination, there is no way other than
looking at facts and circumstances arising from the actual [deal] on the table.” See Gatti, supra note
27, at 188. In other words, if the deal is value maximizing, directors and managers supporting it will
not be in conflict, but if it is not value maximizing, their votes in favor will in fact be conflicted.
136. This Article and mainstream legal and financial literature consider this to be the best
explanation. See supra Part I.B and Part II.B.1.b and infra Part III.A.
137. See Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions,
21 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 333–34 (2005); see also Coates, supra note 37, at 30–34; Offenberg
& Pirinsky, supra note 37, at 333; Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 1–2.
138. “Where public corporations are involved the process of obtaining shareholder approval [in
mergers] is cumbersome and expensive. . . . [T]he cost of the shareholder approval process can easily
run into seven figures.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 339 (2d ed. 2009) (citing costs of
accountants, lawyers, and proxy soliciting firms).
139. Adam Kommel, Proxy Fight Fees and Costs Now Collected by SharkRepellent: MacKenzie
Partners and Carl Icahn Involved in Largest Fights, SHARK REPELLENT (Feb. 20, 2013),
https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=undefined&pg=/pub/rs_20130220.html.
140. Rebel A. Cole et al., The Cost of Advice in Merger & Acquisition Transactions 19–22 (Jan. 15,
2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1458465 (noting that the cost of advice increases with the size of
the transaction); cf. Ari Dropkin, Note, Skin in the Game: The Promise of Contingency-Based M&A
Fees, 103 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1063 (2015) (noting the different fee structures that professionals can use
depending on the circumstances of the transaction).
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attributable to the shareholder meeting only.141 In any event, I do not
believe these costs, alone, should justify doing away with voting. In the
overall level of deal expenses associated with an acquisition, they do not
increase the tab dramatically, especially considering that mergers are
one-off transactions: the costs of a shareholder meeting alone are
overshadowed by other deal expenses.142
On the other hand, calling and organizing a meeting to approve a
merger is time consuming, as Part II.A.4 indicates. In particular, Tables
IV and V show that it normally takes between two and a half to three and
a half months to approve a cash merger (mergers with a stock component
require at least an additional extra month). Below I analyze the main
drawbacks of the current regime, including prolonged time lags between
signing and closing that can distract corporations from running their
businesses, delay integration, put deal certainty at risk, and facilitate
litigation.
a. A Long Time to Close Can Distract from Ordinary
Course of Business, Delay Effective Integration, Result
in Bad Allocation of Resources, and Facilitate
Litigation
An overly long interim period between signing and closing
exacerbates managerial distraction, a cost typical of M&A transactions.143
To degrees, managers must (or opportunistically may want to)144 deviate
from their regular duties in running the day-to-day business to focus on
deal execution. Post-merger integration is a delicate task that normally
requires enormous planning and employee attention.145 Integration does
141. Corporate law firms generally handle the meeting together with a whole host of other
activities, ranging from advising on how the merger talks should be set up to the drafting and
negotiating of the merger agreement, as well as the preparation of all necessary securities, antitrust,
and other regulatory filings. Without direct access to a dataset of lawyers’ bills (with breakdowns of
different activities), it is naïve to try to come up with some reliable figure for the portion of the fees
attributable to the shareholder meeting alone.
142. See, e.g., Cole et al., supra note 140, at 6–10 (finding that pretransaction costs relating to due
diligence, tax planning, and planning complex deal terms represent significant costs such that can
contribute to a decline in the acquiring firm’s returns); see also Christel Karsten et al., Lawyer
Expertise and Contract DesignEvidence from M&A Negotiations 6–11, 24 (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576866 (discussing data relating to merger costs and noting that
significant costs associated with contract negotiations alone could near over $2 million.).
143. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 138, at 339 (“[S]enior corporate officers must expend considerable
time and effort.”).
144. This is the case if they feel the need to impress their future bosses in order to keep a job in the
post-closing entity or to simply advance their career chances.
145. Cf. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 337:
[T]he target company may begin the process of integrating its product line with that of the
acquirer by suspending or canceling the development or improvement of products; may
freeze investment in capabilities that the acquirer already possesses; may shift its research
and development to fit the anticipated postclosing strategic plan; and may discuss with its
customers the buyer’s capabilities in markets where the buyer has been a competitor.
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not finish with the closingquite the contrary, with the closing the
integration becomes real. But when shareholder approval is still pending,
and the process is lengthy, deal uncertainty makes managerial
distraction an even larger issue. Some executives might feel extra
pressure because of it, and the business might suffer for a prolonged time
because of the lack of certainty as to whether there is going to be a deal
or not.146 The usual allocation of resources, both budgetary and staffing,
is altered to accommodate the needs of deal execution. When the deal
ultimately happens, it has faced delay in the integration process and
uncertainty at the target level. In the meantime, the workforce,
customers and suppliers of the target have questioned the prospects of
their respective relationships with the company.147 This issue affects not
only target companies, but buyers as well. More time to get to closing also
means higher fees to transaction advisors paid by the hour: lawyers
primarily, but depending on the industry there may be several additional
consultants involved. Additionally, delay gives the plaintiff’s bar more
time to initiate and maintain active litigationa strategy that is very
often abused in the M&A field. Finally, more time to close exposes to
jawboning and other forms of activist shareholder interference.148
All in all, the longer it takes to close, the greater the destabilizing
impact on the transaction process.149
b. A Long Time to Close Endangers Deal Certainty, by
Stimulating Buyer Remorse and Increasing the Value
of the “Seller’s Put”
A significant delay to close enhances the costs associated with deal
uncertainty.150 In a protracted period between signing and closing,
certain events can occur that might alter, at the eyes of one of the merger
parties, the economics of the deal. A typical feature is buyer remorse,
especially after a hard fought battle with other rival bidders, which often

146. “Anyone who has participated in a bidding war for a large public company knows how
all-consuming the process can be for management.” Coates & Subramanian, supra note 100, at 332 n.78.
147. Cf. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 337:
The announcement of a friendly transaction could lead employees to suspect layoffs or
unwanted changes in the work environment. These expectations could cause more mobile,
and likely more valuable, employees to become less focused on the target and more focused
on their own futures, with the potential of an adverse selection cascade. . . . A target firm’s
customers and suppliers may reconsider their relations with the target in anticipation of
the postclosing situation.
148. See Jiang et al., supra note 129, at 8–10; Boone et al., supra note 107, at 1.
149. Cf. Offenberg & Pirinsky, supra note 37, at 334 (“The cost of waiting reflects potential
disruptions of the production process due to increased uncertainty surrounding the deal outcome.”).
150. See generally Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 1–3 (estimating that, for deals that take 90
days or longer to close, “the target experiences an interim change in standalone value of more than
10% almost two-thirds of the time, and greater than 20% over one-half of the time[,]” and noting that
“overall economic uncertainty will lead to decreases in deal activity.”).
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results in overpayment.151 Buyer remorse is exacerbated when, in the
aftermath of signing a deal, the economy, stock markets, or both
experience a downturn.152 Another important factor when it takes long to
close is the increase in value of the so-called “seller’s put:” The law
generally restrains a buyer’s ability to walk away from a deal,153 but
imposes on the target board the duty to sell at the highest price,154 thus
giving the target the option to pursue alternative offers while at the same
time being able to, at a minimum, “always put itself to the [buyer] at the
[deal] price.”155
The legal and financial literature has stressed the prominence in
merger agreements of risk allocation provisions, such as material adverse
change (“MAC”) clauses that give acquirers “the right to walk away from
the acquisition, without penalty, if a material adverse event (“MAE”)
occurs between the announcement and the completion of the
acquisition.”156 MAC definitions are normally open-ended and
nonquantitative and contain carve outs to certain specific effects that will
not be considered a MAC “even if they might have a severe impact on the
target’s business (for example, developments that affect the economy,
markets or industry generally, changes in law or accounting policies,

151. This was remarkably the case in one of Delaware’s biggest MAC disputes, In re IBP, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001). In then-Vice Chancellor Strine’s words:
To say that Tyson was eager to win the auction is to slight its ardent desire to possess
IBP. . . . But the most important reason that Tyson slowed down the Merger process was
different: it was having buyer’s regret. Tyson wished it had paid less especially in view of
its own compromised 2001 performance and IBP’s slow 2001 results.
Id. at 21–22. On the phenomenon of bidder overpayment, see generally Black, supra note 43, at
599-601 (advancing an “overpayment hypothesis” to describe the reasons why overbidding occurs in
takeover transactions and why target shareholders gain value from such transactions.); see also S.
Michael Giliberto & Nikhil P. Varaiya, The Winner’s Curse and Bidder Competition in Acquisitions:
Evidence from Failed Bank Auctions, 44 J. FIN. 59 (1989).
152. Changing market conditions would, if not alter, at least test the original valuation analysis by
the buyer, which would feel the pressure of capital markets if general market conditions show that the
merger price is excessive.
153. On the difficulty for a buyer to walk away from a deal, see infra notes 160 and 161 and
accompanying text.
154. This of course assumes that Revlon duties apply to the target in the specific deal. See supra
note 64.
155. Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 2.
156. Denis & Macias, supra note 121, at 820; see also Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 331;
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate
Acquisitions, 119 YALE LJ. 848, 865-70 (2010).
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natural disasters).”157 This way, buyers bear exogenous risk post
signing.158
Parties to a merger contract attribute crucial importance to risk
allocation post-signing. A testament to that is the fact that the number
and length of MAC exceptions in M&A contracts expanded dramatically
after the turn of the century.159 Even if historically there have been few
instances of buyers’ walking away from a signed deal,160 renegotiation
attempts are not uncommon: Targets perceive buyer remorse as a real
risk and buyers do the same with respect to the seller’s put that targets
have. Indeed, Denis and Macias report that approximately 9% of
acquisitions in their sample experienced an MAE. According to their
study, an MAE is “the underlying cause for more than 2/3 of the
terminated acquisitions and 80% of the renegotiated acquisitions.”161
Bhagwat, Dam, and Harford recently expanded this field of research by
looking at how the interim deal risk is affected by price volatility in
markets and how that influences M&A activity generally. They found that
targets with underlying higher volatility experience greater swings in
value during the interim period, that this phenomenon is exacerbated in
more concentrated industries, in larger targets, and when the timeframe
to close is longer. Their conclusion is that “[interim period-fueled] price
volatility affects merger activity.”162 In their view, “higher expected
157. Katherine Ashton et al., MAC Clauses in the U.K. and U.S.: Much Ado About Nothing?,
13 PRIV. EQUITY REP. (2013). The definition typically covers any material adverse effect on the
“business, condition (financial or otherwise) or results of operations of the target company and its
subsidiaries, taken as a whole.” Id. See also Choi & Trantis, supra note 156, at 881-96 (discussing and
endorsing vagueness as an effective screen against a promisee’s incentive to sue, which also sanctions
a breeching promisor).
158. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 339 argue that “MAC drafters . . . resolve the ambiguity
in the traditional MAC formulation by creating exceptions to the traditional MAC that would impose
exogenous risk on the buyer.” Denis & Macias, supra note 156, at 827 (observing that exclusions are
normally customized for the particular acquisition and industry of the target).
159. According to Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 331, at the turn of the century, the
negotiation of material adverse changes clauses has been contested and their length has exploded; see
also John C. Coates IV, M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice 21
(ECGI Law, Working Paper No. 292, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2593866 (mentioning
findings by Gilson & Schwartz and Denis & Macias in the MAC literature).
160. In Delaware, parties seeking to invoke a MAC clause bear a heavy burden. See, e.g., Hexion
Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738–40 (Del. Ch. 2008) (finding that there
were no grounds to invoke an MAC clause because such clauses are measured in “years rather than
months” and thus a short-term drop in projected earnings during the gap period was insufficient to
qualify); In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 67–68 (Del. Ch. 2001) (concluding that even
a broadly written MAC clause could not be invoked where there was a 64% drop in quarterly sales over
the prior year because a buyer purchases a company as part of its long-term plan and therefore such
drops must be measured over a “commercially reasonable period.”).
161. Denis & Macias, supra note 156, at 820–21 (mentioning that “material adverse events
ultimately lead to large changes in the price offered to target shareholders. On average, acquirers
negotiate a 15% reduction in offer price when the target experiences a MAE.”).
162. Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 35.
[W]e are investigating a situation where a bidder commits to the investment (thereby
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uncertainty would make the marginal deal less appealing, thereby have
an ex-ante chilling effect on the number of announced mergers.”163
The problem with longer timeframes for completion is the greater
likelihood that either party might experience a change of heart, which
might trigger a cascade of events ranging from renegotiation to
termination attempts. The MAC condition, on the acquirer front, and the
fiduciary-outs required by Revlon duties, on the target one, give the
parties such options.164 Like with any other option, the longer the time to
exercise it, the greater its value.165 Therefore, current timeframes of
shareholder meetings allow parties to be more opportunistic and
tempted to exploit leverage for renegotiation and/or exit purposes. Such
a dynamic, leads to greater volatility of the stock, is a threat to deal
certainty, and carries a negative impact on the M&A market as a whole.
III. SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE RECONSIDERED: IS VOTING IN MERGERS
NECESSARY IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES?
In Part III, I question the status quo that considers voting in mergers
not only in corporate law, but also a fundamental right of shareholders.166
providing the option), but has uncertainty over both the completion of the deal and the
value of the firm being acquired. In our empirical setting, we are able to document that the
elasticity of such investments to an increase in uncertainty is negative and economically
meaningful (approximately -0.3). Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 7.
163. Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 10.
164. Steven Davidoff Solomon, The MAC Is Back, but Does It Kill a Deal?, NY TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Aug. 23, 2011, 3:45 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/the-big-mac-is-back-but-doesit-kill-a-deal/?_r=0 (“A buyer can invoke a MAC clause to try to drive down the price of an acquisition
by taking advantage of either changed market conditions or adverse events affecting the target
company.”); Denis & Macias, supra note 156, at 822:
Between the initial announcement of the merger agreement and completion (or
termination) of the merger (a period of 4.5 months, on average, in our sample), a variety of
events can occur that potentially alter the wealth gains to each party from the acquisition.
During this period, merger terms can be renegotiated and the merger is either completed
or terminated.
165. See Bhagwat et al., supra note 20, at 6 (finding that “renegotiations and terminations are
statistically only more likely when doing so favors the target, consistent with the seller’s put view of
the interim risk.”). When attempting “to value the implied put option[,]” the authors “estimate the
average put to be worth roughly 7% of deal value in a tender offer and 11% in mergers.” Bhagwat et al.,
supra note 20, at 6 (noting that “the average month-to-month changes to the option value due to
volatility changes average 1.8% of deal value, while at the 75th percentile of volatility this number
jumps to 3.1% of deal value.”).
166. Cf. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 n.28 (Del. 2015) (quoting from
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996)): “[W]here a stockholder vote is statutorily required
such as for a merger . . . , ‘the stockholders control their own destiny through informed voting,’” which
is “the highest and best form of corporate democracy.” Id. Similar emphasis on the crucial role played
by shareholder voting can be traced in seminal decisions in the parallel takeover field, such as Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the stockholders are displeased with
the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to
turn the board out.”) and especially Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch.
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Even contractual freedom enthusiasts like Easterbrook and Fischel
support such a right: “the durability and uniform acceptance of the rule
[mandating shareholder approval for mergers and other fundamental
changes] creates a presumption of efficiency that has not been overcome
by any contrary evidence.”167 The merger approval numbers analyzed in
Part II provide an opportunity to reconsider and deconstruct the current
system and examine if it is really necessary for shareholders to vote in all
circumstances, given, on the one hand, the extremely low number of
mergers that get rejected coupled with the very high percentages with
which they get approved, and, on the other hand, the time necessary for
shareholder approval.
After all, only a little more than 1% of the deals submitted to a vote
do not get approved.168 Provocatively, one may argue that the (out-ofpocket and opportunity) costs borne by the 99% of approved deals
subsidize the benefits of rejecting the 1% of deals that shareholders
considered undesirable. Eliminating the voting requirement would
negatively impact only a tiny fraction of deals, while creating benefits in
terms of deal speed and certainty for all the remaining deals, which
almost comprise the entire universe of deals. Of course this logic would
be fallacious. With all likelihood, it is because of the voting requirement
that only 1% of deals get rejected, as the ensuing Part III.A illustrates.
A. THE BENEFITS OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN MERGERS: DEAL
FILTERING AND PREMIUM EFFECT AS BY-PRODUCTS OF THE CREDIBLE
THREAT OF REJECTION
One of the benefits of shareholder voting in mergers is that, without
the voting deterrent, there would be far more deals that shareholders
would have wanted to reject if they only could.169 Like all M&A deals,
1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests.”); see also Paramount Comm’cns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42
(Del. 1994) (“Because of the overriding importance of voting rights, this Court and the Court of
Chancery have consistently acted to protect stockholders from unwarranted interference with such
rights.”).
167. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 115, at 416 (“Perhaps all that can be said is that the
common law rule requiring shareholders’ approval of fundamental corporate changes has endured for
the past century across all jurisdictions. It is unlikely that this pattern would be observed if the rule
did not produce gains.”). But see also id. at 415 for a discussion on the dichotomy between the general
power of directors to run the business of the corporation and shareholders’ powers to veto
fundamental changes such as mergers, whereby they concede that “[a]lthough this dichotomy is so
well established in corporate law that it is never questioned or analyzed, the justifications for it are
obscure”).
168. See supra Part II.A.1.
169. Of course, there is no way to prove this with absolute certainty because we cannot observe
(and compare) voting outcomes of mergers that directors never formally propose; Burch et al., supra
note 21, at 46. Nor can we observe (and compare the desirability of) mergers for public and contestable
companies that are not subject to the voting requirements, which is what ultimately allows empirical
studies on the desirability of shareholder voting at the acquiring firm level. See infra note 183.
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mergers are conflict-inducing situations in which shareholder approval
works as a way to constrain how the agent operates.170 The credible
threat171 of shareholder rejection operates as a safety valve in case of
director malfeasance or ineptitude:172 Directors anticipate the risk that a
merger might get voted down and present deals they feel comfortable will
be approved. However, sometimes they mistakenly feel too comfortable
about a deal and overestimate shareholder support, which explains why
some deals pass with narrow approval margins and some fail
altogether.173 Abandoning the voting requirement would generate, to
borrow from the language of tort law, undesirable activity level effects for
mergers. Without shareholders’ policing potential bad deals, there would
be more of them. I call this the “deal filtering effect” of voting.
While it is impossible to provide firm evidence supporting this
hypothesis (for the simple fact that we do not get to see how shareholders
would react to deals that are never presented to them), some data
analyzed here supports this explanation. Mergers subject to the more
stringent approval requirement of 2/3 of the shares proportionally
experienced a higher level of mergers approved in the 75%–87.49% range
(76.2% in the 2/3 Approval Sample v. 56.6% in the Majority Approval
Sample), suggesting that when a supermajority is required, directors
accomplish more in terms of approval numbers. This may be a result of
the greater efforts spent to garner the votes when merger approval is
perceived to be more at risk (and possibly because of stricter selection of
the submitted deals). An additional indication that voting serves an
important filtering effect can be found in comparing the rate of merger
rejection in my sample (around 1%), which is based on deals that are
formally submitted to shareholder vote, with the rates presented in other
studies, which instead take into account a wider universe of deals,
including some that have not formally been submitted to shareholder
approval. Such latter rates average at around the 20% level.174 True, there
170. To illustrate the point in simple terms, in the verge of being acquired, directors and managers
might resolve to trade-off a higher merger consideration for shareholders with some assurance that
they (or some of them or some key members of management) will stay with some role with the
combined company after the merger is completed. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. In other
words, directors face an endgame situation providing incentives to collude with the buyer against
shareholders’ interests. Note incidentally that voting is hardly the only way to ensure directors make
decisions in the best interest of shareholders: A liability regime of enhanced fiduciary duties would
often (but not always, as Revlon duties are not triggered in a merger-of-equals scenario. See supra
note 64) bolster this pressure on directors. But see the recent Corwin line of cases, which has softened
the pressure coming from a judicial second-guessing of the transaction when informed, uncoerced,
and disinterested shareholders have approved it. See supra Part I.C.
171. See supra note 114.
172. Similarly, Thompson and Edelman consider voting in mergers as a mechanism of “error
correction of managers.” Thompson & Edelman, supra note 1, at 141. I prefer using “credible threat of
rejection,” as an expression that better describes the deterrent element of the vote.
173. Burch et al., supra note 21, at 46.
174. See supra notes 67, 119, 120, and accompanying text.
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can be several explanations for why a deal never makes it to the
shareholder approval stage (lack of financing, regulatory reasons, rival
bids, a MAC); still, the perceived lack of shareholder support would
certainly be a valid one.
To better capture the filtering effect of voting, future empirical
research should focus on mergers abandoned prior to submitting them
for approval and understand how many of them were dropped because
the parties anticipated rejection by shareholders.
Rejecting bad deals is not the only beneficial aspect of shareholder
approval; voting has an effect on premiums as well. Because
shareholders’ power to say no to mergers worries directors, it pressures
them to increase their bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the acquirer. In the
words of then-Vice-Chancellor Strine, “[a]lthough stockholders are not
well positioned to use the voting process to get the last nickel out of a
purchaser, they are well positioned to police bad deals in which the board
did not at least obtain something in the amorphous ‘range’ of financial
fairness.”175 As a result of their policing, shareholders get to approve
deals with more appealing premiums.176 Indeed, from a corporate
planner perspective, a sizeable premium is the best way to forestall
rejection; the threat of rejection itself is something directors and
managers can credibly convey to an acquirer who will ultimately have to
offer a better price to avoid such a risk. Without the voting requirement,
both directors and acquirers would feel less pressured to present a
premium that is satisfactory to shareholdersas a result, each approved
deal would carry a smaller premium.177 I call this the “premium effect” of
voting.
175. In re Cox Comm’cns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005).
176. For the reasons stated at the end of Part II.A.2.b, the fact that premiums and voting outcomes
in the Majority Approval Sample do not correlate, as shown in such Section, does not mean
shareholders are indifferent to premiums.
177. While it does not require a stretch to imagine that in all likelihood premiums would be lower
without the threat of shareholders vetoing the deal, hypothesizing the premium could have been larger
appears quite problematic. The only remotely plausible story for larger premiums in a world without
shareholder approval is that with more deal certainty, a buyer would be inclined to pay more, but that
would be inconsistent under two distinct aspects. First, empirical evidence shows that higher
premiums are associated with the presence of more invasive deal protection mechanisms: that is,
buyers are willing to pay more on the upward scenario of deal completion, if they get compensated
with higher consolation prices in the downward scenario of non-completion that would trigger a
lock-up option or a break-up fee. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 100, at 391. This means that
buyers do not address the non-completion risk by offering less upfront: when they are averse to
uncertainty they in fact offer more, in order to obtain better protection for the worst-case scenario of
losing to a rival buyer. Another way to look at it is that the extra premium they pay works just like an
insurance premium to obtain a higher payment if the risk materializes. But if uncertainty were
eliminated, one can infer that an acquirer would be more confident to offer less: at a minimum, deal
protection mechanisms would be unnecessary and their current influence on higher premiums would
likely disappear. Second, hypothesizing larger premiums in a world without shareholder approval
would miss the fact that the role played by shareholders represents only one of the three macro areas
of deal uncertainty, the other two being regulatory approval and topping bids. Coates & Subramanian,
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All in all, the true value of voting is the credible threat that
shareholders will turn down unviable deals; such a threat motivates
directors to present only deals that are considered “approval material.”
Voting in mergers should be seen as a quasi-dormant veto power that
gets triggered when there is a need to reject a bad deal, but even when
not triggered its looming threat brings the added virtue of keeping
directors and managers honest when negotiating, because corporate
planners cannot know ex ante the reaction from the public of
shareholdersthis dynamic has positive effects on the size of
shareholder premiums.
B. CREDIBLE THREAT OF REJECTION VS. OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF VOTING:
EXPERIMENTING A DEPARTURE FROM THE CURRENT VOTING REGIME
Even recognizing the beneficial effects of shareholder intervention
in mergers, voting involves both out-of-pocket costs and opportunity
costs in terms of delay. The latter in particular can be troublesome as it
can jeopardize a company’s operations and endanger deal completion.178
Therefore, a question that deserves careful consideration is whether the
credible threat of shareholder rejection needs to be necessarily dressed
as a full-blown vote in each circumstance. Consider that departures from
the voting prerogatives of shareholders are not unheard of, even in the
context of mergers.179 From a formal standpoint, voting as a procedure is
not an absolute in those jurisdictions contemplating action by written
consent by a majority of shareholders.180 Substantively, the M&A market
had already turned its back on voting when it envisaged two-step mergers
with top-up options.181 And Delaware’s relatively recent legislative
supra note 100, at 310. The former, in particular, can be (and often is) the reason for further delay of
closing beyond the date of shareholder approval, see supra Part II.A.4 and the discussion around Table
IV, so getting rid of shareholder approval would at best take care only of a subset of deals: Those that
are not complex and time consuming from a regulatory approval standpoint, which would have closed
earlier if it was not for the voting requirement.
178. See supra Part II.B.2.
179. Shareholder prerogatives in mergers have progressively receded both in terms of the votes
required for merger approval and the actual need for a vote. This process started in the late 1800s,
when states abandoned the old unanimity requirement, and continued in the twentieth century, when
supermajority turned into majority requirement. For more detail, see supra notes 31–33 and
accompanying text. Also, states started to do away with the need of an actual vote with the introduction
of short-form merger statutes. Delaware passed one in 1937 to cover wholly-owned subsidiaries and
expanded the statute in 1957 to include parent/subsidiary mergers where the parent company owns at
least 90% of the subsidiary. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 244 (Del. 2001)
(detailing a chronology of short-form mergers in Delaware).
180. Under Section 228(a) of the DGCL stockholder action may be taken by written consent in lieu
of a meeting, unless prohibited or made it harder by the certificate of incorporation (for instance, by
requiring unanimous consent). I reckon that such a strategy is admittedly a remote possibility in
mergers where the target is a contestable company with dispersed ownership, which is the type of
merger under discussion in this Article.
181. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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history has all but blessed abandoning voting as a necessary step with the
introduction of the medium-form merger under Section 251(h) of the
DGCL.182
The remaining portion of this Article investigates whether the
system can endure an extra step in corporate law experimentation by
allowing companies to somehow relax the voting requirement. The
working assumption is to keep intact what is truly crucial in the current
system (the deterrent aspect of the vote), while reducing its main cost
(delay). In other words, is it possible to maintain the credible threat of
rejection by shareholders in place, but at the same time speed up the
process to benefit the overwhelming majority of deals? Are there
conceivable changes to the current voting process that can achieve both
goals?
1. Sketching Possible Reform Proposals
Researchers should explore other alternatives. In Part III.B.1,
I consider potential reform proposals and possible objections specific to
each proposal. In Part III.B.2, I consider more general obstacles to
reform, such as decreased protection for shareholders, futility of reform,
and overall unfeasibility and resistance by interest groups. Overall, the
purpose of this last part of the Article is not necessarily to push for a
reform, but rather to deconstruct the current system, to better
understand and possibly improve it. Before I address this task, I note that
there has not been any significant debate on the issue of whether voting
in mergers should be reconsidered from the target perspective. The M&A
literature has focused on the protection of shareholders of the acquirer,
by investigating whether providing them voice in every circumstance
would make good policy183currently, in Delaware their vote is limited
182. See supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text and infra Part IV.B.2.b.i.
183. Empirical studies have focused on shareholder vote in mergers from an acquirer perspective
for two main reasons. The first reason is that studies show that acquirer’s shareholders generally
experience negligible or negative returns in connection with M&A deals. See generally Klaus Gugler
et al., Market Optimism and Merger Waves, 33 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 159 (2012) (providing
evidence that the long-term effects of takeovers for acquiring shareholders are negative on average).
An explanation for this is that empire building-prone managers have a tendency to pursue bad
acquisitions and/or overpay. See Roll, supra note 43, at 212; Black, supra note 34, at 599–600. This
is why shareholder voting at the acquirer is suggested as a device to screen out detrimental deals. See
Coffee, Jr., supra note 43, at 1269–72. Second, while a shareholder vote is generally required for the
target, on the acquirer’s front, shareholder voting is required only in limited circumstances (namely,
if the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation is changed or the number of shares does
not increase more than 20%. See supra note 34 and accompanying text) and therefore it is possible to
empirically test the difference in shareholders’ returns in acquisitions that require their vote and those
that do not. Some authors argue shareholder voting has an impact only because it delays deals, not
because it screens out potentially detrimental ones. Ehud Kamar, Does Shareholder Voting on
Acquisitions
Matter?
23–25,
31–32
(Mar.
2011),
http://www7.tau.ac.il/blogs/law/
wp-content/uploads/2011/11/March-2011.pdf (suggesting that shareholder voting should be
reconsidered). Others believe that voting does have a positive allocative function in the market for
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to specific transactions.184 No similar debate exists around the
desirability of voting at the target level, for the consensus considers it a
quasi-sacrosanct shareholder right in the context of a fundamental
transaction.185
a. Vote-on-Demand
The first working proposal, which was originally suggested by Ehud
Kamar in the context of shareholder approval at acquirers,186 is to
simplify the system by having a merger vote only if a minimum
percentage of shareholders (for example, any percentage in the 3%–10%
range, as required by the organizational documents) so requests in
reaction to the specific terms and conditions of the given deal. Since a
rejection in the current regime is a rare exception, the need for an actual
vote by shareholders would become an exception as well, which would be
triggered if, in case the merger raises suspicion, one or more
shareholders aggregating a non-de minimis stake ignite the voting
process and the right to veto the merger. This way the credible threat
system, and therefore the deal filtering and premium effects, would
remain substantially intact. The advantages of this approach are twofold.
First, it takes care of the problem of avoiding a vote when it is not
warranted, which in turn results in less transaction costs and quicker
deals. Second, it preserves the truly important function of voting, namely
the deterrence posed by the credible threat of rejection.
The smoothest way to introduce this system would be through
private ordering. Voting in mergers would continue to be the main
regime; however, voting would no longer be mandatory, but rather the
default provision in an enabling regime.187 Corporations would be
corporate control: in their studies, bad deals occur less recurrently when shareholder voting is
required. See Becht et al., supra note 35, at 31–32 (focusing on acquisitions in the U.K. market and
finding that so-called Class 1 transactions, which require shareholder approval, are associated with an
aggregate gain to acquirer shareholders of $13.6 billion, whereas U.S. transactions of similar size,
which are not subject to shareholder approval, are associated with an aggregate loss of $210 billion for
acquirer shareholders; Class 2 U.K. transactions, also not subject to shareholder approval, are
associated with an aggregate loss of $3 billion); Li et al., supra note 115, at 32 (finding that acquirers
subject to the voting requirement generate an average 4.3% excess return upon announcement as
compared to acquirers that do not need shareholder approval).
184. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
186. Kamar, supra note 183, at 4.
187. As Ian Ayres has pointed out, in the world of private ordering, selecting a default regime vs.
an opposite one has significant implications over the choice the parties will ultimately make. See Ian
Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012). An
“always voting” default with freedom to opt out by selecting the vote-on-demand regime would be
superior than a vote-on-demand default with freedom to opt into an “always voting” regime. This view
finds consensus in the literature. According to Bebchuk and Hamdani, the choice of default should be
based on which selection can be reversed more easily by shareholders. Under their theory, an efficient
opting out is more attainable and likely to occur when directors support it than when they oppose it,
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allowed to opt out of voting by selecting the vote-on-demand system,
which would basically work as a menu statute.188 Note that, by its nature,
vote-on-demand would essentially let shareholders opt back into voting
on a deal-by-deal basis if they feel the particular merger deserves a vote.
Thus, the consequences of contractual freedom on minority shareholders
would be less severe than in other instances, in which opting out
represents a once-and-for-all relinquishment of a right that could protect
investors (think, for instance, of Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL, which
allows companies to opt out of and waive monetary liability for breach of
the fiduciary duty of care by their directors).189
The minimum percentage to exercise the right is something that, in
an ideal world, companies should be free to decide to best adapt to their
underlying ownership structure. However, since conflicts might be at
play,190 state corporate law should establish a maximum threshold
companies cannot depart from: that would ensure that the threshold is
not so high that shareholders cannot really use the protection. While it is
impossible to guess the perfect number, especially because companies

hence they advocate the choice of a default that in the abstract is more favorable to shareholders than
directors. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution,
96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 502–03 (2002) (discussing asymmetries in the reversibility of default regimes).
For a similar view, see Luca Enriques et al., The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an
Application to the European Union), 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 85, 113 (2014) (“Especially in the current
U.S. environment of predominantly institutional ownership and high shareholder meeting turnout,
managers could persuade shareholders to accept only efficient opt-outs.”). For an empirical test of this
theory, see Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical
Examination, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279, 292–95 (2009) (analyzing statutory defaults in the
U.S. and finding that companies are unlikely to opt out of takeover-restrictive defaults in their
organizational documents).
188. See generally Listokin, supra note 187, at 280 (describing menu statutes).
189. For the same reason that corporate laws in the U.S. permit eliminating monetary liability of
directors and officers only with respect to violations of the duty of care, but not of the duty of loyalty,
it would be misguided to leave it up to companies to decide to opt out of voting in mergers altogether.
A pure opt out system would essentially allow companies to do away with the credible threat system.
Because in companies that opt out shareholders would never be able to vote in mergers, not even on a
deal-by-deal basis, directors and managers would never fear rejection and their loyalty in connection
with M&A activity could be seriously questioned. In fact, abolishing the deterrent element embedded
in the vote would give improper incentives to craft deals that advantage directors at the expense of
shareholders. Assuming all companies opted out, we would soon face the potential for widespread
excess in M&A activity with negative consequences for capital markets, since investors, in a typical
market for lemons setting, would likely discount stocks systematically because of the risk of being
exploited in subpar deals with side payments or favors to insiders; cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market
for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
190. For a discussion of how conflicts of interest might steer efficient contractual arrangements in
M&A-related rules-of-the-game, see Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Creeping Acquisitions in Europe:
Enabling Companies to Be Better Safe than Sorry, 15 J. CORP. LEGAL STUD. 55, 96–100 (2015) (arguing
that enhancing contractual freedom for European companies could counter their general weakness to
creeping acquisitions, and that adequate procedures against conflicted voting should be in place to
contain self-serving choices by target boards and their significant shareholders).
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have different ownership structures, something in the 3%–10% range
would seem sensible.191
I am not oblivious to the fact that such a regime would encounter
criticism. First, some might claim that shareholders would still need to
be informed on the deal in order to decide whether or not to exercise the
vote. Second, others might claim that requiring a minimum percentage
to trigger the vote would entail coordination costs for smaller
investors.192 Third, some might even object that institutional investors
would likely take a prudent stance and always decide to trigger a vote.
The first two objections concern the disruptiveness of the reform, and the
third objection admonishes on its ineffectiveness.
With respect to the first objection, shareholders should still receive
detailed information to make an informed decision (on whether or not to
request a vote for the merger), but such an information statement will
generally not be subject to review or comment by the SEC.193
Shareholders should also be given sufficient time to decide. Perhaps this
period should be fifteen to twenty days following receipt of such
statement, similar to what is required today under Section 251(c) of the
DGCL. If enough shareholders request a vote, the proxy materials will
incorporate such prior disclosures and include additional ones tailored
for the upcoming meeting and the actual vote. If no such request is made,
the merger could be completed upon the expiration of the period to
request a vote. Appraisal rights would obviously still survive, but their
procedure would need to be harmonized with the new regime.194
The second objection exposes the risk that the right to trigger a vote
would rarely be used, because of the nuisance to go through procedural
hurdles, especially for smaller investors who would face nontrivial
coordination costs. One way to address this concern is to give investors,
along with the disclosure materials described above, some way to
communicate back to the company their intention to hold the votethis

191. Note incidentally that 3% was the cut-off ownership level chosen by the SEC when it
implemented its short-lived proxy access rule (SEC Rule 14-a11), which was famously struck down on
other grounds by the D.C. Circuit in Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (arguing that the basis of the rule were not adequately rational from a cost/benefit
analysis standpoint). Because after such decision proxy access may still be adopted on an opt-in basis,
it has been observed that companies that have used private ordering have overwhelmingly picked such
3% threshold. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 39, at 211.
192. In other words, this rule would redistribute from non-coordinated minority shareholders to
the large or more coordinated oneswho might have to be bribed to avoid the vote.
193. Otherwise, if we maintained the disclosure process similar to what we have now, the regime
would not be capable of reducing today’s closing timeframes. However, it would certainly be prudent
to keep the SEC informed on a pending deal and, in some specific and extraordinary circumstances,
the SEC should still have powers to intervene and request supplemental information.
194. Note that appraisal rights are limited under the corporate laws of certain states. For instance,
in Maryland, a corporate charter may eliminate appraisal rights. Cf. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS
§ 3-202(c) (2017).
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could be done through some sort of preliminary ballot card to be returned
in the mail or, better, via some digital and secure communication (this
way, there would be less suspicion that the company is tampering with
the results).
The third objection is that some large investors would probably be
biased to trigger the vote, irrespective of the underlying merits, even
when the merger is profitable and getting the consideration sooner rather
than later would be the rational course of action. For instance,
institutional investors may be inclined to act prudently and trigger the
vote. Likewise, some hedge fund investors may want to extract
advantages, as it has been happening with the recent phenomenon of
jawboning in connection with activist arbitrage activities,195 and decide
to trigger a vote. True, especially at the outset, institutional investors
might conservatively choose to require for a vote on a systematic basis.
However, that would happen for pure risk aversion and cultural habit
because of the old rules. In the absence of red flags on the specific deal,
there would be no reason to trigger the vote. In fact, the vote would
represent a waste of time and money for the corporation and, ultimately,
for the fund’s investors. Their decision would be based on their
understanding of today’s legal framework, where shareholder approval is
an essential prerequisite of a long-form merger. Eventually, once the new
rules have been tested for a while and shareholder approval is no longer
a typical feature of noncontroversial mergers, institutional investors may
have the opposite concern of avoiding useless votes for desirable deals.
As far as merger arbitrage activists are concerned, the objection can be
rebutted with the intuition that in the long run, they will focus only on
mergers that raise some actual concern. Also, if there is confidence the
merger will be approved by the shareholders, corporate planners will
know how to not cave to whatever request or concession the activist
seeks. Some soft greenmailing will always be present, but that is no
reason to refrain from improving the system.
Finally, one might also object that the current M&A market is
modeled by, and M&A contracts are synched to, the shareholder approval
requirement. The newly proposed system would somewhat disrupt
present-day M&A contracting and lawyers would need to reinvent the
wheel to reflect the contingent nature of a shareholder vote. However, as
I mention below,196 this is hardly a reason to avoid pursuing a reform.
Nobody doubts lawyers would quickly figure out how to craft merger
agreements in a new legal landscape, because this is what they are paid
to do all the time.

195. See generally Jiang et al., supra note 129.
196. See infra Part III.B.2.b.ii when dealing with more general drawbacks of changing the current
system.
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b. Randomized Approval
To quicken the merger process while maintaining the element of
deterrence embedded in the voting system, an admittedly bolder reform
would be to keep voting only for a fraction of deals and exempt several
other transactions from the approval requirement, which could then be
completed on a faster track. This could be achieved by randomly selecting
mergers that will ultimately be subject to shareholder approvalsuch
selection, to occur after the merger agreement is signed and announced,
should operate based upon a probability ratio of mergers ultimately
subject to the vote (say anything in the 20%-40% range). The idea is that
corporate planners would not know ex ante if their proposed merger
would ultimately require shareholder approval, so they would continue
to act as loyal agents to shareholders under the assumption that approval
might be necessary. Just like the regular citizen does not know if her
taxes will be audited by the IRS still complies with tax laws (also) because
of the threat of potential enforcement, this system would maintain a
certain level of pressure on management to act as loyal agents of their
shareholders when negotiating a merger. There is a myriad of other
examples of how the threat of enforcement works as a deterrent: from the
risk of running into traffic cops when driving to how our luggage gets
checked at customs when entering a country. And this proposal actually
finds some corroboration in the current merger regime, which has a
similar mechanism in the SEC’s power to review only certain
proxy/registration statements in connection with a merger vote:
“the Division [of Corporate Finance] selectively reviews transactional
filingsdocuments companies file when they engage in public offerings,
business combination transactions, and proxy solicitations. To preserve
the integrity of the selective review process, the Division does not publicly
disclose the criteria it uses to identify companies and filings for review.”197

In other words, the abstract principle of selecting certain
transactions for a more thorough regime is not foreign to our legal and
regulatory environment for mergers. Certainly, though, a randomized
approval system would take it to a new level.
There are three predictable objections to this regime. First, the
number of mergers in a given year is nothing compared to how many
people file their taxes, drive cars or come back from a trip abroad. While
the former can well tolerate a heavier filtering regime, the latter activities
clearly cannot. The problem with this objection is that it proves too much.
By using the same logic, one should then always justify a cumbersome
regime whenever the overall number of transactions is limited, which is
at odds with what a sophisticated M&A regime should be. A

197. Div. of Corp. Fin., Filing Review Process, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
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policymaker’s focus should be on the merits of the particular screening
regime, instead of simply calling for, or tolerating, heavy enforcement
just because it is practically feasible.
Second, one might object that, because the risk of getting “caught”
submitting a detrimental deal would be lower than under a straight
shareholder approval regime, corporate planners might be tempted to
propose subpar transactions that would not have otherwise been
submitted under the existing system. For instance, they could low-ball
shareholders and hope that the merger will not become subject to
shareholder approval. A simple numerical example illustrates the issue.
Assume that the premium effect of the existing shareholder approval
requirement amounts to a fraction of the merger consideration, say 10%
(assume further that deal planners know shareholders’ reservation
price). In other words, without a credible threat of rejection, what would
have been a $10 per share merger consideration under the existing rules
would be $9 and the merger would still go through. Now, if the
probability for the transaction to become subject to a vote is only, say
30% (and the parties know about this), risk-neutral buyer and
risk-neutral target would agree on $9.30 instead of $10 per share. Or,
more realistically, that same buyer could simply offer $9 per share; only
if and when the transaction is selected for a vote would it renegotiate the
deal and increase the price. A simple way to address this latter problem
is to not allow price increases if the transaction is selected for a vote. But
that would not take care of the other problem as risk neutral corporate
planners would agree on a blended price based on the expected
probability of having to submit to a shareholder vote (in the example,
shareholders would only be offered $9.30 and not $10 per share).
I doubt that persons negotiating a merger can be realistically
considered risk-neutral actors who simply price-in the approval risk. For
starters, there is no real way they can diversify away the risk of becoming
subject to merger approval other than through some price adjustment
mechanism (automatic or otherwise), which, again, should not be
permissible. Therefore, going from $10 to $9.30 counting on the 30% of
being subject to approval would represent serious risk-taking on a
transaction in which corporate planners have a lot to lose from a career
and reputation standpoint.198 Just like (almost) everyone complies with
their taxes because of fear of being audited, corporate planners are quite
aware of their own risks. Also, similar to the SEC process for selecting
which transactional documents to review,199 the system should be set up
in a way that does not allow corporate planners to estimate with precision
198. See supra note 115.
199. “To preserve the integrity of the selective review process, the Division [of Corporate Finance]
does not publicly disclose the criteria it uses to identify companies and filings for review.” Div. of Corp.
Fin., supra note 197, at 2.
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the probability of subjecting the transaction to shareholder approval.
This would weaken the very foundation behind offering a lower price.
A third, more granular issue this system would face is
implementation. Who would select which mergers are subject to a
shareholder vote? For example, a well-meaning agency would likely face
significant pressure to have deals go on the fast track. If solely
administered by bureaucrats, a suspicion of collusion and favoritism for
certain
companies
would
probably
find
its
crowd
of
supportersespecially in today’s conspiracy theory-prone society. But
there are some manageable ways to help make these doubts disappear.
The first thing that comes to mind is to have a reputable office, say the
Court of Chancery in Delaware, in charge of administering a software not
subject to human manipulation that makes the random selection.200 This
is merely an example. Of course, there can be many other ways to
implement the regime without raising suspicion of special treatment for
certain corporations or transactions.201
Note that this regime could also be adopted in conjunction with the
vote-on-demand system I described in Part III.B.1.a: a milder
introduction of the regime could provide that, if a given merger does not
get picked for a vote by the random selection mechanism, shareholders
representing a minimum percentage of shares of the target company can
still demand that the transaction be subject to approval. And of course
this regime should be conceived on an optional basis only. While leaving
the current system as default (that is, requiring a shareholder vote at the
target company), companies could determine if they want to adopt a
vote-on-demand regime, a randomized approval regime, or a
combination of the two.202
c. A Shorter Approval Timeline: Streamlining SEC Proxy
Rules and Corporate Statutes.
While the two approaches suggested above have the advantage of
eliminating, or at least reducing the overall incidence of, shareholder
approval when unwarranted, while still maintaining its deterrent effect,
they undoubtedly represent a stark break from the status quo. For
whatever reason (I survey some likely objections in Part III.B.2 below),
policymakers might not be ready to make any significant departure from
the current voting regime. Therefore, a less ambitious reform to consider
200. A banal Google search of “Yes No Random Generator” shows how simple this software can be.
201. This proposal uses an approach essentially similar to the one Mexico has adopted to enforce
its customs regulations. Mexican airports use a “red lightgreen light” system for customs. If the
person entering the country has put “nothing to declare” on her customs form, she will need to simply
push a button: If the light is green, she will exit without inspection; while if the light is red, she will be
subject to inspection. Because the selection is random, there is no way for her to know ex ante which
light (green or red) she will get and therefore the expectation is that she will comply.
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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would maintain the shareholder approval requirement, but simplify and
shorten the SEC review process, as well as corporate law formalities, to
get to a vote (and completion) more quickly. For instance, under the
current rules, it takes ten calendar days for the SEC to notify the target if
it intends to review the filing of the preliminary proxy statement on
Schedule 14A.203 If the SEC intends to review it, the Commission
normally takes up to thirty calendar days from the original filing to send
its comments, at which point a back and forth of amended filings and
further SEC comments take place until the SEC clears a definitive
disclosure document that can be mailed to shareholders. This
amendment process can take several weeks, sometimes months.204
Finding some way to cut this phase to what is necessary can save several
days, if not weeks, in the process. Similarly, state corporate laws can be
reviewed to reduce the length of the process. For instance, Delaware law
mandates a twenty-day minimum waiting period between the mailing of
the proxy statement and the date of the meeting.205 Such a timeframe
could probably be reduced by five to seven days without major
disruptions in light of the fact that preliminary proxy statements are
made publicly available before the definitive is ready and the investor
public does not realistically need all that time to ponder.
The main idea behind streamlining the SEC review process is that
tender offers, which are themselves subject to SEC review and
supervision, can be carried out in a much faster fashion, even as fast as
thirty days, with no criticism to the effect they do not afford adequate
information to shareholders. Why not consider a comparable timeframe
for mergers?206 True, mergers are bolder in their effects than tender
203. SEC Filing Requirements, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2017).
204. LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, GUIDE TO ACQUIRING A US PUBLIC COMPANY 5 (2015).
205. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2017).
206. The formal dichotomy between mergers and tender offers is a leitmotif of the U.S. M&A
practice, which has been shaped by the possibility for corporate planners to freely use each of the
different structures to achieve their acquisition goals. In the past, Delaware judges protected the
formal distinction and M&A players’ ability to rely on the independent legal significance of each
structure. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances
in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. ChrisCraft, 60 BUS. L. 877, 879 n.10 (2005) (“The courts have long respected th[e] ability to choose among
the various methods for accomplishing a business transaction through judicial recognition of the
doctrine of independent legal significance.”). At the same time, judges have “admit[ted] being troubled
by the imbalance in Delaware law[,]” which such distinction ends up creating. In re Pure Resources,
Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 443 (Del. Ch. 2002). A case in point is the tortured evolution of
freeze-out law, whereby Delaware courts for quite some time had used a formalistic approach that
applied different standards of review to going private transactions depending on how a freeze-out is
structured: before the CNX and MFW decisions introduced a unified standard (see Kahn v. M & F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645–55 (Del. 2014) (explaining that the business judgment standard
of review applies if the controlling stockholder subjects the merger to the necessary approval of: (i) a
special committee of independent directors with separate financial and legal advisors, fully
empowered to reject the transaction and negotiating a fair price with due care and (ii) a majority of
the unaffiliated stockholders, fully informed and not coerced); In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig.,
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offers in that a dissenting shareholder in a merger is bound by the
approval by its fellow shareholders, whereas a shareholder who holds out
in a tender offer keeps her shares. But these distinctions are more
formalistic than anything. First, through the system of tender offers,
shareholders might sometimes be called to make decisions on hostile
deals, which is something that never occurs with mergers that are, by
structure, negotiated transactions. In other words, a shareholder in a
tender offer might sometimes be confused between two adversarial
narratives, while a shareholder in a merger decides with a clearer
informational framework (absent a proxy campaign to defeat a
merger).207 Second, with the introduction of the medium-form merger
under Section 251(h) of the DGCL, tender offer disclosures have de facto
already taken over the merger onesso there is little substance for
justifying resistance to a simplified and equivalent process.208 This last
observation begs the inevitable question: why bother changing merger
rules when in fact corporate planners can bypass a vote via Section 251(h)
of the DGCL? I address this objection below in Part III.B.2.b.i when
dealing with more general problems of reforming the current system.
2. Assessing Possible Criticism to a Reform and Fine Tuning
This Part addresses some possible critiques to departing from the
current voting requirements in mergers. In Part III.B.2.a, I dismiss
objections based on some misconceived rationales behind shareholder
approval in mergers, while in Part III.B.2.b, I tackle more general
concerns including ineffectiveness the proposed reforms, alleged
decrease in shareholder protections, as well as pushback by interest
groups.
a. Dismissal of Some Misconceived Justifications Behind
the Shareholder Approval Requirement
Aside from the advantage of representing a credible threat of
rejection with important deal filtering and premium effects,209
4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010)); a negotiated merger between a controlling stockholder and its
subsidiary was reviewed for entire fairness (Kahn v. Lynch Comm’cns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del.
1994).), while under In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch.
June 19, 2001), a parent/subsidiary unilateral tender offer followed by a short-form merger was
reviewed under a less demanding standard than entire fairness.
207. On the very few instances of mergers facing activist campaigns to defeat them, see supra
Part II.A.2.
208. If the parties to a cash merger pursue a two-step structure pursuant to Section 251(h) of the
DGCL, the only disclosures shareholders of the target will receive will be pursuant to the Williams Act,
and not under Schedule 14A under the Exchange Act. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; SEC
Filing Requirements, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2017). This means that the system does not deem such
disclosures (and the timetable that goes with them) essential for shareholder protection.
209. This is the rationale for shareholder voting in mergers to which this Article subscribes. See
supra Part III.A.
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shareholder approval could also be said to foster further desirable policy
goals, such as preserving the expression of shareholder choice,
facilitating competing bids and auctions, and reducing litigation risk. The
following Subparts address each of these claims.
i.

The “Sanctity” of Voting: Expressing Shareholder
Choice in Mergers

In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,210 Chief Justice Strine
stressed the importance of the shareholder franchise in mergers by
quoting excerpts from Williams v. Geier:211 “where a stockholder vote is
statutorily required such as for a merger . . . , ‘the stockholders control
their own destiny through informed voting,’” which the Williams Court
called “the highest and best form of corporate democracy.”212
Entrusting shareholders with the power to decide is supported by
the idea that a merger is a transaction with momentous consequences for
them and voting is the best way to determine their preference,213
especially because those who own more shares are deemed to have better
incentives to make the right decision.214
However, a rationale for shareholder approval in mergers based on
the sanctity of voting is aprioristic as it does not explain why voting is
more important here than in other instances. By using this same simple
logic, one should then expect a system that vests shareholders with
decisional powers in other circumstances as well. In other words, to state
that voting in mergers is beneficial because shareholders have a say on it
does not explain why shareholders are supposed to be the best
decisionmakers in mergers, as opposed to many other corporate actions
in which they similarly bear the consequences of director decisions. The
most obvious example is buy-side acquisitions, but there are many
morethink derivative transactions, refinancing, launching a new line of
business, expanding in markets abroad and so forth.
ii. A Delayed Vote Facilitates Competing Bids and
Auctions
As previously noted,215 shareholder approval in connection with a
merger takes time, from a minimum of 8 weeks to more than 200
210. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 n.28 (Del. 2015).
211. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996).
212. Id.
213. Cf. Zohar Goshen, Voting and the Economics of Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets
Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 399 (2003) (noting that “the voting mechanism is based on the
assumption that the majority opinion expresses the ‘group preference,’ that is, the optimal choice for
the group as a whole.”).
214. They have better incentives because they can reap the benefits (or alternatively bear the bad
consequences) of their choice. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 408–09.
215. See supra Part II.A.4.
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hundred days, with medians of approximately 90 and 130 days for cash
and stock deals respectively.216 In such a long period, other buyers can
use the time to plan a rival bid, offer more, and eventually win.217 The
collateral effect of the longer merger timetable might benefit
shareholders and improve the allocative efficiency of the market for
corporate control, by creating a framework for companies to be sold to
the highest buyer.218 Consequently, a delayed vote would also have the
advantage of satisfying Revlon.219
This rationale to support voting in mergers is not satisfying for two
reasons. First, the M&A market has already managed to get around the
voting requirementsomething which the Delaware legislature has
approved. Over the years, deal planners found ways to counter the voting
completion risk by structuring two-tier acquisitions, whereby the
acquirer obtains control through a faster-paced tender offer and
subsequently completes the merger as a second step, once the risk of
being topped by a rival bid has disappeared. As mentioned earlier,220 a
fairly complex system of top-up options was engineered to help bidders
get to the 90% threshold and avoid a shareholder vote by passing a shortform merger pursuant to Section 253 of the DGCL. The Delaware
legislature substantially endorsed this type of structure by making the
second-step merger easier to approve. Section 251(h) of the DGCL
dropped the shareholder voting requirement altogether so long as certain
conditions are met (most importantly, the first-end tender offer obtains
50%, or the higher percentage required to approve a merger under the
company’s organizational documents, of the shares). All in all, the market
has responded to the longer timetable of mergers with a different
structure with which Delaware law has no issue.

216. For a discussion, see supra Part II.A.4.
217. It is well-established that longer timeframes for deals facilitate rival bids and auctions.
See CLARK, supra note 40, at 553 (discussing the purpose of twenty business days, as the minimum
period for tender offers pursuant to SEC Rule 14e-1 under the Williams Act).
218. A sale to the highest buyer is desirable because the person willing to spend the most on the
target is considered the most efficient user of the asset from an efficiency standpoint. For the argument
that auctions are beneficial for the market for corporate control, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment,
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1052–55 (1982) (arguing
that a delay to facilitate competing bids for a target is beneficial and would lead to more efficient
transactions in the market for corporate control); Ronald Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus
Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 61–62 (1982). For a critique, see Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17
(1982) (arguing that “shareholders are unlikely to gain from rules that promote auctions” and that
“[p]rivate and social wealth is greatest when bidders choose their own time periods and disclosures,
subject to a prohibition of fraud”); Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian
Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 169–84 (1988) (arguing that efficiency does not require that assets
move immediately to the highest value user, as any transfer of an asset to a higher value user would be
efficient).
219. See supra note 64.
220. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Second, any Revlon argument would be misplaced. On the one hand,
a merger with a Delaware target is not per se sufficient to trigger Revlon
(a sale or change of control being the actual prerequisite).221 On the other
hand, the duty to act as “auctioneers charged with getting the best price
for the stockholders at a sale of the company”222 embedded in such
doctrine cannot rely on the timing requirements of merger transactions.
Such requirements do not apply to change of control transactions that
are not mergers (that is, tender offers), and, on top of that, they are not
the product of merger laws per se, but rather derive from disclosure
requirements stemming from SEC regulations.223 And this is without
even mentioning that some jurisdictions repudiate, or significantly
reduce the impact of, the Revlon doctrine.224
iii. Shareholder Voting Reduces Litigation Risk After
Corwin
Voting in mergers has a standard-shifting effect that can chill
litigation efforts by the plaintiff’s bar. Under Corwin and its progeny, a
fully informed and uncoerced vote of disinterested stockholders subjects
a merger transaction (other than one triggering entire fairness review) to
the more lenient business judgment review, irrespective of whether
Revlon is applicable in the abstract.225 In the presence of such a vote, the
litigation route becomes very difficultthe policy goal is in fact to chill
strike suits challenging merger transactions.226 Additionally, in light of
the more recent Volcano decision, even two-step transactions that do not
structurally require a vote (think a tender or exchange offer in connection
with a Section 251(h) DGCL procedure227) have a similar standard of
review-shifting effect when a majority of shareholders express their
approval of the transaction by tendering their shares.228 Therefore, in
light of the Corwin decision and its progeny, a reduction of litigation in
the M&A field would appear to be a rather important contribution of the
voting system, which the proposed reforms might put at risk.
221. See supra note 64.
222. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
223. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
224. See Barzuza, supra note 29, at 2009–15 (mentioning that six states, Indiana, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Maryland, and Virginia, have clarified that the enhanced duties under
Revlon do not apply, or apply with major qualifications, to companies incorporated therein).
225. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 309 (Del. 2015).
226. As stated by Chief Justine Strine:
When the real parties in interestthe disinterested equity ownerscan easily protect
themselves at the ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard
of review promises more costs to stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions
on risk-taking than it promises in terms of benefits to them.
Id. at 313.
227. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

GATTI-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

904

4/6/2018 4:01 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:835

A couple of qualifications are in good order. First, under this line of
cases, litigation is not chilled altogether; rather, it must refocus on
specific pathologies of the merger process. In fact, Corwin is essentially
telling plaintiff counsel the only reasonable path to a favorable judgment
post-closing is to claim the vote was uninformed (by challenging the
disclosures, or lack thereof, to shareholders), coerced, or swayed by a
conflicting interest.229
Second, rather than a natural consequence stemming from the very
nature of the vote, the standard of review-shifting effect is a specific
policy choice that judges made to reduce litigation.230 In the Corwin line
of cases, courts attach a standard of review-shifting effect to a certain step
in the overall merger transaction, which displays the consent of
shareholders as a group. Consider that, to shift to business judgment
review, judges clarified that the occurrence of an actual vote is not even
necessary. As noted, the Volcano decision applied the Corwin doctrine to
medium-form mergers under Section 251(h) of the DGCL, in which a
formal vote does not take place.
Therefore, assuming a formal stockholder vote was no longer
necessary in some mergers, a judge could still identify, in the context of
a new, abridged merger procedure, some element that somehow displays
the consent of shareholders. For example, the absence of a stockholders’
request to hold a vote would indicate the transaction does not raise
suspicion amongst stockholders and justify shifting to business judgment
review to chill litigation.231 But more importantly, it is the very law
introducing a vote-on-demand system that should affirm a standard of
review-shifting effect for when shareholders do not request an approval

229. Given the close to nil instances of rejection votes in connection with mergers, see supra Table
I, the Corwin doctrine de facto kills suits seeking monetary damages post-closing. All there is left,
really, are the exceptions to the doctrine: lack of disclosure, coercion, and conflict of interest. The
policy question is whether this adequately protects investors. At a minimum, one might wonder
whether a shareholder who voted against should maintain the right to sue and claim damages. Only
time will tell if the abuse in the filing of strike suits has decreased in the aftermath of Corwin and its
progeny. What is clear from the most recent pronouncements is that the Chancery Court has indicated
eagerness to apply the Corwin doctrine quite broadly. See supra note 56.
230. In other words, the standard of review-shifting effect, cannot be regarded as if it were
expressing some overarching principle with respect to shareholder voting. At best, it is an attempt to
sanction the inconsistent behavior of approving a corporate action and then suing for taking such
action (venire contra factum proprium, is how Roman law would put it). But of course, purporting to
characterize Corwin as an example of a legal rule prohibiting inconsistent behavior would be a stretch.
It would in fact assume that a majority vote could dispose of the minority’s individual right to sue,
which would be at odds not only with basic tenets of logic and justice, but also with established
principles of Delaware law, which explains why judges have specifically spelled out certain conditions
for the Corwin safe harbor to apply.
231. Similar to how judges created the safe harbor for mergers in Corwin to then extend it in
Volcano to tender offers that are part of a medium-form merger, they could extend the safe harbor
even further to a deemed consent mechanism like the one in the vote-on-demand system proposed
here.
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vote; that same law should also possibly clarify what conditions need to
be satisfied to entertain such an effect (for example, that shareholders are
informed, uncoerced in their decision to do away with the vote, as well as
disinterested).
True, no deemed consent element could be traced with respect to the
randomized approval system, which does in fact contemplate that several
mergers (such as, those that are not selected for a vote) would pass
without any shareholder involvement. For all such mergers, it would
seem quite difficult to justify the standard-shifting advantages embedded
in Corwin. Thus, in theory, all such mergers would still be subject to the
perils of frivolous litigation, which all pre-Corwin mergers were subject
to.
However, even if a randomized approval mechanism does not
contribute to a standard of review-shifting effect, this should not be a
reason for dismissing such a reform. Indeed, randomized voting would
simply be an option companies could opt into if they so desired. To use
it, companies would need to make choices at two different levels: when
introducing it in the charter and, subsequently, when approving the
specific merger. Each company should be free to decide on its own on the
trade-off between completion speed and litigation risk. Based on the
history of the CNX and MFW safe harbors, companies do not always
choose litigation shields.232 Therefore, even companies that are subject
to the randomized approval regime could still decide not to avail
themselves of the shorter process and submit the merger to a vote if they
intend to take advantage of the Corwin doctrine. Again, directors would
essentially have to choose between the costs of delay in completion versus
the costs of strike suits. Both involve out-of-pocket and opportunity
costs, except that the former are borne exclusively by shareholders, while
the latter are somewhat shared by shareholders and directors (assuming
standard indemnification provisions and D&O policies are in place).233

232. After CNX introduced what later became, with some adjustments, the MFW safe harbor,
several deals purportedly did not use the safe harbor, but rather opted for the more burdensome entire
fairness route, because of the completion risk embedded in the majority of the minority condition,
which is a requirement for the safe harbor to apply. See Sunjeela Jain et al., Examining Data Points
in Minority Buy-Outs: A Practitioners’ Report, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 939, 950 (2011).
233. This trade-off would raise an interesting dilemma: What would be the implications of
voluntarily subjecting a merger to a vote when not required under the law, which is something
directors might want to do when approval is not expected to be an issue (that is, the vote on the merger
is not a narrow one)? Such a decision would signal that, rather than subjecting the deal to a faster
track, which would have been beneficial for shareholders, directors prefer to meet the requirements of
the safe harbor, which is beneficial to them primarily. So one might then wonder, with some malice,
why directors would pursue a safer route in an apparently noncontroversial merger if they have done
nothing to be afraid of.
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b. Other Objections to a Departure from the Current
System
Aside from concerns citing the benefits of shareholder voting within
the merger procedure, the proposal to modify the voting requirement as
currently conceived might draw additional criticism. This Part addresses
the following objections: (i) a reform to minimize the costs of voting
would be trivial because the system already allows to skip a vote through
the medium-form merger under Section 251(h) of the DGCL; (ii) easing
up the voting requirement would be a setback in shareholder protections;
and (iii) any reform would give rise to resistance from interest groups.
i.

“But the Substitutes . . .” Is Reforming the Merger
Process Even Necessary with Section 251(h) of the
DGCL?

A practical objection might be that Section 251(h) of the DGCL
already takes care of excessive delay in the merger procedure with no
need to replicate the efforts for mergers more generally.234 Complying
with the medium-form merger procedure allows corporate planners to
skip the vote and still achieve the main advantage of a merger, binding
the dissenting shareholders. Shareholders can “voice” their approval for
the merger via their tender decisions. If more than the required majority
to approve a merger tender their shares, the second-step merger will take
place without an actual vote. Why bother improving the current system
if the goal being sought is already accomplished by an alternative
acquisition technique?
There are four sets of reasons why Section 251(h) of the DGCL does
not make attempting to reform the merger procedure moot. First, the fact
that the goal of speed is already achieved via a tender offer is not a valid
reason to stop improving long-form merger rules. Otherwise, by applying
the same logic, one should not be bothered if mergers took, say, an
average of a year to close: “Want a faster deal? Use a tender offer!”
Rather, each acquisition technique deserves a stand-alone, dedicated
analysis on how to pursue improvement. Leaving aside the bolder
proposals (vote-on-demand and randomized approval), just consider the
less ambitious one to shorten the timeline of shareholder approval. It
would be bizarre if policymakers did not consider such policy simply

234. According to Afsharipour, supra note 37, at 48, “Section 251(h) transactions have become
quite popular” (citing a report by Paul Hastings indicating that almost all two-step tender offers “have
opted into the section 251(h) scheme.”). Financial economists label “traditional mergers with voting”
as “inefficiently structured” transactions. See Boone et al., supra note 107, at 3 (“By side-stepping the
vote and delay created by a proxy filing, the tender offer . . . lessens exposure to market risk, material
adverse events and other sources of volatility, and reduces managerial distraction and potential loss
of key suppliers and customers”). This could increase the value of the target to bidders, leading bidders
to offer a larger premium for the shares.
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because medium-form mergers are available to corporate planners. Not
only does that make little sense, but it also sets a dangerous precedent
for condoning lack of experimentation whenever we have equipollent
structures for getting to the same goal. It would be paradoxical if having
freedom to choose between two structures becomes an excuse for
limiting the appeal of one of the options.
Second, tender offers have drawbacks of their own. From a buyer’s
perspective, tender offers are not a viable route if acquisition financing is
not yet in place upon the launch of the transaction. This essentially
means that only fully-funded buyers can choose a medium-form merger
structure.235 From an investor perspective, even if Section 251(h) of the
DGCL, by mandating that the price to be paid in the second-step merger
be the same paid in the tender offer, seemingly cures the pressure to
tender problem generally affecting tender offers,236 in reality there are
still avenues to pursue coercive and subpar acquisitions. Nothing under
Section 251(h) of the DGCL prevents a buyer from closing a tender offer
that fails to obtain less than the required majority. A buyer could in
theory waive the minimum tender condition (normally set at the greater
of 50% and the majority necessary to approve a merger at the single
company) and purchase, say, only 40% of the stock in the tender offer.
The buyer could then subsequently proceed to additional creeping

235. Offenberg & Pirinsky, supra note 37, at 333 (reporting that, in practice, tender offers are
generally fully financed at the outset to meet the three-day requirement under SEC Rule 14e-1(c), in
which bidders must pay a tendering shareholder within three days of the close of the tender offer and
the antifraud requirement of SEC Rule 14e-8(c) that a bidder have a reasonable belief it can purchase
the securities sought).
236. See In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 743 (Del. Ch. 2016):
Section 251(h) . . . alleviates the coercion that stockholders might otherwise be subject to in
a tender offer because (1) the first-step tender offer must be for all of the target company’s
outstanding stock, (2) the second-step merger must ‘be effected as soon as practicable
following the consummation of the’ first-step tender offer, (3) the consideration paid in the
second-step merger must be of ‘the same amount and kind’ as that paid in the first-step
tender offer, and (4) appraisal rights are available in all Section 251(h) mergers, subject to
the conditions and requirements of Section 262 of the DGCL. Thus, Section 251(h) appears
to eliminate the policy bases on which a first-step tender offer in a two-step merger may be
distinguished from a statutorily required stockholder vote, at least as it relates to the
cleansing effect rendered therefrom.
Note that the fact that the consideration to be paid in the second-step merger must be of the same
amount and kind as paid in the first-step tender offer, makes the medium-form merger somewhat
similar to Lucian Bebchuk’s proposal that, to eliminate distorted choice in takeovers, tender offer
regulation should at the very least give shareholders the chance to tender their shares in a second
round, after the initial tender period expires. That way, those who do not tender in the first round in
the hope that the tender offer failed would still have an opportunity to sell their shares and not become
minority shareholders of the bidder. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal
Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1797–98 (1985). The situation is of course
not identical, because in medium-form mergers shareholders do not have any chance to decide in the
context of the second-step merger, which essentially forces them to exchange their shares for the
merger consideration.
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purchases of stock in the target or perform a parent subsidiary merger. I
understand that with these facts there would still need to be a vote before
any merger takes placebut my point is that Section 251(h) of the DGCL
is not a perfect solution against a bidder’s lowball offer, which can
become the prequel of a lowball going private transaction.
Third, relying exclusively on the advantages of a different
acquisition structure in order to maintain mergers’ appeal from a
timetable perspective is dangerous. In fact, there is no way of knowing if
tender offers will continue to be a market’s favorite or will become
unappealing again. That might well happen for whatever reason, market
or regulatorysecurities, tax, accounting, and so forth. If the history of
the best price rule has any lessons,237 it is that functionally equivalent
acquisition techniques give corporate planners opportunities for
structural arbitrage, with each single structure being potentially sensitive
to market or regulatory changes.
Finally, if it is true the M&A market benefited from the speedier pace
of the merger process under Section 251(h) of the DGCL,238 I would argue
there are even more reasons to extend a faster route to traditional
mergers, not less. In other words, the success of Section 251(h) of the
DGCL shows there is still unfinished business for policy makers. It would
be interesting to see if other states decided to anticipate Delaware in
easing up timing constraints under traditional mergers.239
ii. Reforming Voting in Mergers Would Be a Setback
in Shareholder Protections
One argument might be that scaling back on voting would lessen
shareholder protections. Reforming shareholder voting in mergers might
upset those who take shareholder rights seriously.
However, a careful analysis of the suggested reform proposals
demonstrates that shareholders prerogatives are safeguarded. True, the
optics might give the appearance that voting rights in mergers are
diminished. But in substance, the bulk of shareholder protections remain
intact. In the vote-on-demand procedure, shareholders can still vote,
they just need to activate the right; the randomized vote procedure gives
shareholders ex ante a substantial likelihood that they will have a say to
approve or reject the merger, which in turn should generate enough
pressure on directors to propose viable deals in general; and finally,

237. See supra note 37.
238. Boone et al., supra note 107, at 6 (“Our results suggest that DGCL § 251(h) has had a net
positive effect for target shareholders of Delaware firms, and facilitates improved deal structuring.”).
239. Maryland, Texas, and Virginia already emulated Delaware in introducing their own versions
of the medium-form merger. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-106.1 (2015); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE
tit. 2, § 21.459(c) (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718.G (2015).
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shortening the approval timeline does not take away shareholders’ voting
rights at all.
To be very clear, nowhere in this Article do I support shrinking
merger-related disclosures. Under each of the proposals, shareholders
would be receiving information in substance similar to what they
currently receive under Forms 8-K, 14A, 425, and S-4. What would
change is that in two out of three proposals shareholders might end up
not casting their vote in certain mergers. Similarly, appraisal rights and
their related timeline would not be altered. Of course, the architecture of
merger agreements would have to change to adapt to a different statutory
regime. Quite frankly, though, this should be the last of a policymaker’s
worries as no one can doubt skilled corporate lawyers would quickly
adapt their contracts and ensure a smooth transition to the new regime.
Finally, altering the statutory regime in mergers in the ways I
propose has no bearing in diminishing shareholder prerogatives in the
other areas sensitive to the broader debate on their role in corporate
governance. In other words, there are several distinct fields, from
executive compensation240 to proxy access,241 from majority voting242 to
staggered boards243 and shareholders’ role in the adoption or repeal of
takeover defenses,244 in which the degree of shareholder empowerment
is completely disjointed from whatever role the system assigns to
shareholder approval in mergers. And in no way should any
reconsideration of the merger procedure alter the politics of other
corporate governance battles.
240. See generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, PART II: POWER AND PAY (2004).
241. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate,
65 BUS. L. 329, 333–39 (2010) (arguing that proxy access should be the default rule and not a menu
for companies to opt into), with Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access,
97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1347–48 (2011) (arguing that proxy access would create more strategic
disadvantages than cost savings for challengers).
242. For a critical view, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance
Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 2011–12 (2014) (arguing that a majority voting requirement to elect a
board is less relevant than its proponents would admit: “[m]ajority withhold votes are rare
events . . . If they happen, they usually result in change in policy even under a plurality standard; but,
for companies with a plurality standard, they rarely result in a change in the board”).
243. Compare Bebchuk et al., supra note 29, at 890, 944 (highlighting the powerful effect of
combining poison pills with staggered boards and proposing that “[c]ourts should not allow managers
to continue blocking a takeover bid after they lose one election conducted over an acquisition offer”),
with Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections,
55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002) (arguing in favor of a director primacy-based standard for reviewing the
tandem use of classified boards and poison pills).
244. Compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 522–23 (1997)
(arguing for the validity of bylaws amendments requiring poison pill rejection), with Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street?,
73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 424 (1998) (arguing that poison pills bylaws amendments are inconsistent with
the grant of directorial authority of Section 141(a) of the DGCL).
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iii. Pushback from Interest Groups
Interest groups might organize and resist change, which is what they
normally do if they perceive a reform might endanger their power and
prerogatives.245
On the “demand side,”246 proxy solicitors, accountants, corporate
lawyers, and other constituencies currently charge fees in connection
with shareholder approval in mergers.247 Will they react to a change in
the regime that reduces the centrality of such approval and might mean
a reduction in revenue for these interest groups? That is quite possible,
even though in reality the proposed changes would not have a significant
effect on their bottom lines, at least as far as lawyers and accountants are
concerned.248 As mentioned, none of the proposals actually implies a
scale-back on disclosures provided to shareholdersat most, a reform
would entail a repackaging of the contents of current disclosures and a
different timetable that goes with them. To be a bit cynical, lawyers might
object to a shorter process because, all else being equal, fewer days to
closing mean fewer days to bill their client.249 None of these concerns
should convince a sensible policymaker to desist from a reform effort.
The far bigger problem a reform may face is on the “supply side.”
One of the two crucial policymakers in the field, the SEC,250 will most
likely raise concerns, possibly out of any of the potential problems
suggested in Part III.B.2.251 The current merger process gives the SEC
power and prerogatives. It would not be surprising if a departure from
the current process generated resistance from the agency.252 Note
245. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (arguing that small and organized groups exercise political influence to
maximize and preserve the groups’ gains).
246. On the distinction between “demand side” and “supply side” interest group pressure, see
Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of
Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1089, 1090 (1991).
247. As bankers are not paid by the hour and would benefit from faster-paced deals, I would not
expect the investment banking industry to oppose.
248. If one considers proxy solicitors, they make the bulk of their business on routine matters:
Mergers are one-off transactions that come only every once in a while. The impact of reform should
not be so significant. See Asaf Eckstein, Great Expectations: The Peril of an Expectations Gap in
Proxy Advisory Firm Regulation, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 89–98 (2015) (describing the primary role
of proxy advisors in corporate governance functions that are more common than extraordinary
corporate transactions such as mergers).
249. In other words, the longer a process drags, the greater the opportunity to charge legal fees;
this is just one of the consequences of billing by the hour. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price
of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 964–65
(2000) (noting that the higher the number of hours devoted to a matter, the higher the legal fees: the
“hours required to resolve a legal matter are not fixed by abstract and immutable principles of justice.”)
Id. at 965.
250. The other, of course, would be the state legislature.
251. One obvious candidate is the setback in shareholder protection as mentioned in the
immediately preceding Subpart. See supra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
252. “The SEC’s major litigation efforts and regulatory initiatives have been designed to protect
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incidentally that the SEC could de facto oppose a reform even after it is
enacted by a state legislature. Consider that the long timetables in the
current regime do not derive from state law requirements, but are a
by-product of the Commission rulemaking and the way it administers its
rules.253 In other words, it is plausible the SEC would try to replicate a
disclosure regime similar to what is existing and hence maintain the
current level of delays even under more lenient “vote-on-demand” or
randomized approval regimes under state law. In any event, if no merger
reform is attainable because of a push-back by the SEC, it would actually
validate the idea that the crucial factor behind the lengthy timetable of a
merger is the SEC itself. Such a validation should help policymakers
focus on what to do about it.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of data on voting outcomes in mergers, demonstrating
a very low number of mergers that are filtered out by shareholders, could
tempt someone to infer thatbut for rare exceptionsvoting is mere
rubber-stamping by shareholders.254 That, however, would miss the
point that deals are presented to shareholders only after long
negotiations take place between the two companies with each board of
directors actually assuming that the merger will be subject to shareholder
approval. In other words, voting does play a role, yet not through an
actual resolution approving or rejecting. Rather, it is via the expectation
that shareholders will turn down undesirable deals that voting positively
affects mergers. The mere requirement of the vote implicates a credible
threat that such deals might not be approved, which implies that valuedecreasing deals will not be proposed to shareholders in the first place
(deal filtering effect of voting). That same dynamic ensures that deals
carry sizeable premiums, most likely higher than in the absence of a
threat of rejection (premium effect of voting).
However, voting has its drawbacks, the most significant being the
delay in deal completion, which can jeopardize the company operations
and put deal certainty at risk.255 If the beneficial role of shareholder voice
in mergers does not really lie in the actual outcome of the vote, but rather
stems from the pressure on management brought by the credible threat
the Commission’s regulatory turf, rather than to further important areas of public policy.” Jonathan
R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the
SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 948 (1994). On a policymaker’s preference for rules that would
maintain such policymaker’s clout “at the center of corporate law,”; see also Mark J. Roe, Takeover
Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 321, 345 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) (discussing such predisposition in Delaware
judges).
253. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Tables I–III and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part II.A.2.
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of rejection embedded in the vote, I wonder whether policymakers could
engineer alternative ways to exert such pressure without incurring the
costs that voting carries with it. In other words, it is not my intention to
eliminate or limit shareholders’ right to vote in mergers, I simply
challenge the way they currently do it. To that end, this Article suggests
three possible policy solutions, ranging from impactful (vote-on-demand
and randomized vote, both to be opted into by companies in lieu of the
current voting regime) to more moderate (speeding up the approval
process). Because none of the foreseeable objections to any such policy
appears insurmountable, this Article recommends policymakers,
companies, and their constituencies consider improving the merger
procedure.
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Acquirer /
Merger
Partner

Company

Year
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Table II.A
Approval Percentages and Premiums
(Majority Approval Sample)
Year

Avg Appr % Votes Cast
(Yes Vs. No/Abstain) Median

2010

98.92%

2011

99.41%

2012

99.25%

2013

98.83%

2014

98.5%

2015

98.46%

Entire Period

98.9%

Avg Appr % Votes Cast
(Yes Vs. No/Abstain) Mean
(Standard Deviation)
95.31%
(11.74%)
97.36%
(5.15%)
97.64%
(4.26%)
97.91%
(3.34%)
95.88%
(7.12%)
95.85%
(3.43%)
97.02%
(6.29%)

915
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Table III.A
In Regression A, I compare the percentage of outstanding shares
approving the merger (dependent variable) to the merger premium
(independent variable) calculated against the price of the stock on the
day prior to the announcement of the transaction (t-1 premium), as
publicly disclosed in the proxy statement or S-4 by the target or the
acquirer, as the case may be. The observed mergers are those included in
the Majority Approval Sample. In Regression B, I do the same exercise,
but instead of comparing percentage of outstanding shares approving the
merger against t-1 premiums, I compare such percentages against
unaffected premiums. Again, I retrieve unaffected premiums from
securities filings.256 In Regression A, the test shows a minimal regression
coefficient (-.019), combined with a large standard error (.026) and low
R-squared (adjusted) (-.0015). Similarly, in Regression B, the test shows
a minimal regression coefficient (.006) combined with a large standard
error (.027) and a low R-squared (adjusted) (-.003). Both regressions
indicate lack of predictive value on the premium variable. “SS” means
sum of squares. “DF” means degrees of freedom. “MS” means Mean
Squares (SS/DF).
Regression A: Shares in Favor and T-1 Premiums
Source

SS

DF

MS

314

.007396345

Number of
Observations
F (1, 312)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Root MSE

Model
Residual

.003951089
2.31110483

1
312

.003951089
.007407387

Total

2.31505592

313

Approval
Percentage
T-1
Premium
Constant

Coef.

Std. Err.

T

P>|T|

[95% Conf. Interval]

-.0191364

.026202

-0.73

0.466

-.0706915

.0324186

.7642477

.0092717

82.43

0.000

.7460047

.7824907

0.53
0.4657
0.0017
-0.0015
.08607

256. If the securities filing relating to a merger in the Majority Approval Sample does not include
reliable information on either the shares in favor or the relevant premium (whether t-1 or unaffected),
I disregard from the observation the relationship between the shares in favor and the premium (t-1 or
unaffected, depending on what premium is missing) for such merger. For a discussion on premium
calculations, see supra note 86.
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Regression B: Shares in Favor and Unaffected Premiums
Source

SS

DF

MS

289

.007331542

Number of
Observations
F (1, 312)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Root MSE

Model
Residual

.000363326
2.11112089

1
287

.000363326
.007355822

Total

2.11148421

288

Approval
Percentage
Unaffected
Premium
Constant

Coef.

T

P>|T|

[95% Conf. Interval]

.0056601

Std.
Err.
.0254678

0.22

0.824

-.0444673

.0557875

.7575103

.0106857

70.89

0.000

.736478

.7785426

0.05
0.8243
0.0002
-0.0033
.08577
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Table IV.A
Coefficient Estimates with Adjustments for Premiums
and Ownership
The first part of this Table IV.A reports coefficient estimates and, in
parentheses, R-squared (adjusted) values from estimating an ordinary
least squares model in which the independent variable is the merger
premium and the dependent variable is the percentage of outstanding
shares approving the merger, calculated as follows: “Shares in Favor” is
the percentage of outstanding shares approving the merger; “Shares in
Favor w/o Insiders” is the percentage of outstanding shares approving
the merger excluding shares held by directors and managers; and “Shares
in Favor w/o Voting Agreement” is the percentage of outstanding shares
approving the merger excluding shares subject to a voting agreement
whereby the parties agreed to vote their shares in favor of the merger.
Premiums are presented on t-1 and unaffected bases.257 Column (1)
represents the full available dataset of mergers with premiums calculated
on a t-1 basis. Column (2) represents the dataset of Column (1), but
excludes transactions in which the premium is below 10% (noise
adjustment) or above 60% (outlier adjustment). Column (3) represents
the dataset of Column (2), but excludes transactions in which the
difference between the unaffected premium and the t-1 premium is 25%
or more (to adjust for noise in the t-1 premium). Column (4) represents
the full available dataset of mergers with premiums calculated on an
unaffected basis. Column (5) represents the dataset of Column (4), but
excludes transactions in which the premium is below 10% (noise
adjustment) or above 60% (outlier adjustment). The second part of table
breaks down Column (3) and Column (5) by type of consideration (cash,
stock or combination thereof). N is the number of observations.
Information about premiums, ownership by insiders, shares subject to
voting agreements, and type of consideration was collected from the
securities filing of the underlying merger.

257. See supra note 256.
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T-1
Premium
(Entire
Sample)

10%<= T-1
Premium<=
60%

(1)

Unaffected
Premium
(Entire
Sample)

10%<=
Unaffected
Premium
<= 60%

(2)

10%<= T-1
Premium<=
60% And
Unaffected
Premium – T-1
Premium <=25%
(3)

(4)

(5)

-.02

0.03

0.09

0.03

0.1

(-.001)

(-.005)

(-.005)

(-.003)

(-.001)

-.18

-.02

-0.02

-.09

0.04

(.012)

(-.005)

(-.008)

(-.000)

(-.004)

-.20

0.08

0.01

-.045

0.05

(.02)

(-0.004)

(-.008

(-0.003)

(-.002)

314

191

120

289

194

10%<= T-1
Premium<=
60%
And Unaffected
Premium – T-1
Premium <=25%

10%<=
Unaffected
Premium <=
60%
N

Cash

0.09

(Adj. R-Squared)

(-.01)

Stock

919

0

(Adj. R-Squared)

(-.12)

Combination

-0.23

(Adj. R-Squared)

(.05)

78

N
0.064

128

-0.003
11

-0.04

21

(-.04)
31

0.05
(-.02)

45
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Table V.A
Coefficient Estimates Excluding Mergers with Voting
Agreements and Insider Ownership > 5%
Table V.A reports coefficient estimates and, in parentheses,
R-squared (adjusted) values from estimating an ordinary least squares
model in which the independent variable is the merger premium and the
dependent variable is the percentage of outstanding shares approving the
merger, calculated as follows: “Without Voting Agreement” is the
percentage of outstanding shares approving the merger, in deals where a
voting agreement was not present; and “(1)+Insider Ownership<=5%” is
the same dataset as “Without Voting Agreement” but also excludes
transactions where insiders held more than 5% of the shares outstanding.
Premiums are presented on t-1 and unaffected bases.258 Column (1)
represents the full available dataset of mergers with premiums calculated
on a t-1 basis. Column (2) represents the full available dataset of mergers
with premiums calculated on an unaffected basis. N is the number of
observations. Information about premiums, ownership by insiders, and
shares subject to voting agreements was collected from the securities
filing of the underlying merger.
T-1 Premium

Without Voting
Agreement
(Adj. R-Squared)

(1)

Unaffected Premium
T-1 Premium
(2)

-.05

-.029

(.008)

(-.004)

(1)+Insider
Ownership<=5%
(Adj. R-Squared)

-.017

.019

(.086)

(-.006)

N

247

182

258. See supra note 256.
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Table VI.A
Average Premiums when Insider Ownership or Voting
Agreement Are Pivotal, Average Premiums with / without
Voting Agreement
In this Table VI.A, I compare average premium sizes for the whole
sample with averages premium sizes for circumstances in which insider
ownership or the shares subject to a voting agreement were pivotal in
reaching the required majority to approve the merger. Premiums are
presented on t-1 and unaffected bases.259 Premiums do not significantly
differ among the categories. “Insider Ownership Pivotal” represents the
dataset of mergers in which the votes by directors and managers were
pivotal in approving the transaction. “Voting Agreement Pivotal”
represents the dataset of mergers in which the votes subject to a voting
agreement were pivotal in approving the transaction. “Mergers With
Voting Agreement” is the dataset of mergers in which there is a voting
agreement whereby the parties agreed to vote their shares in favor of the
merger. “Mergers Without Voting Agreement” is the dataset of mergers
in which there is no such agreement. N is the number of observations.
Information about premiums, ownership by insiders, and shares subject
to voting agreements was collected from the securities filing of the
underlying merger.
T-1 Premium

Insider
Ownership
Pivotal
Voting
Agreement
Pivotal
Mergers With
Voting
Agreement
Mergers
Without Voting
Agreement
Majority
Approval
Sample

Unaffected Premium

Mean

Median

N

Mean

Median

N

36.0%

31.5%

25

38.8%

36.9%

23

35.5%

33.4%

28

31.9%

32%

21

31.9%

29.4%

140

47.4%(*)

34.6%

120

30.9%

26.0%

193

37.1%(*)

33.2%

185

31.1%

28.6%

333

41.0%

34.0%

305

(*) Given the apparent difference in values, a t-test was conducted
on the means of unaffected premiums for Mergers With Voting
Agreements and Mergers Without Voting Agreements. The t-value was
computed as -1.2864, with 303 degrees of freedom. This results in a
p-value of 0.199, which is too high to pass the 95% confidence interval
test.
259. See supra note 256.
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Table VII.A
Average Premiums in Top 30 Mergers, Bottom 30
Mergers, 2/3 Approval Sample, and
Majority Approval Sample
This Table VII.A compares average premiums (means and medians)
for each of the following categories: the 30 mergers that obtained the
most votes in favor in terms of outstanding shares (“Top 30 Votes in
Favor”), the 30 mergers that obtained the least votes in favor (“Bottom
30 Votes in Favor”), the 2/3 Approval Sample, and the Majority Approval
Sample. Premiums are presented on t-1 and unaffected bases.260 As the
table shows, there is no significant difference between Top 30 Votes in
Favor and Bottom 30 Votes in Favor. Similarly, no significant difference
exists between average premiums in the 2/3 Approval Sample and the
Majority Approval Sample (aside from medians of t-1 premiums, which
differ mainly because some entries of t-1 premiums are noisy: after
adjusting for such noise, the median is 25.3%). N is the number of
observations. Information about premiums was collected from the
securities filing of the underlying merger.
T-1 Premium

Top 30 Votes In
Favor
Bottom 30
Votes In Favor
2/3 Approval
Sample
Majority
Approval
Sample

Unaffected Premium

Mean

Median

N

Mean

Median

N

33.8%

31.0%

24

36.3%

30.0%

21

33.0%

30.1%

27

34.9%

30.3%

24

25.5%

22.1%

29

33.5%

32.5%

29

31.1%

28.6%

333

41.0%

34.0%

305

260. See supra note 256.
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Table VIII.A

Cross-Correlations
Table VIII.A represents cross-correlations between key variables in
the dataset. “Shares in Favor” is the percentage of outstanding shares
approving the merger. “Insider Ownership” is the percentage of shares
held by directors and managers of the target company. “Voting
Agreement” is the percentage of shares subject to a voting agreement
whereby the parties agreed to vote their shares in favor of the merger.
Premiums are presented on t-1 and unaffected bases.261 Information
about premiums, ownership by insiders, and shares subject to voting
agreements was collected from the securities filing of the underlying
merger.
Shares In
Favor
Shares In Favor

T-1 Premium

Unaffected
Premium

Insider
Ownership

1

T-1 Premium

-0.033

1

Unaffected Premium

0.092

0.633

1

Insider Ownership

0.121

0.138

0.142

1

Voting Agreement

0.059

0.286

0.092

0.640

261. See supra note 256.

Voting
Agreement

1
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Table IX.A
Time between Signing and Closing Dates
Year

No. Of
Observed
Mergers

Time Between Signing And Closing Dates
Median

Mean
(Standard
Deviation)

25th
Percentile

75th
Percentile

172
(106)
168
(93)
173
(99)

98

217

106.5

223.5

103

228

85

146

104

184

89

172

124

259

110

255.5

112

262

All Deals
2014

67

136

2015

87

136

Entire Period

153

137

100% Cash Mergers
2014

33

110

2015

41

121

Entire Period

74

114

Mergers With Stock
Consideration
2014

34

177

2015

45

169

Entire Period

79

177

138
(94)
160
(103)
150
(99)
205
(108)
188
(79)
197
(94)

